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TYPICAL RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY, A. B., A. M.

PRESS OF T. MOREY & SON
GREENFIELD, MASS.
1917

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PREFATORY NOTE

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TYPICAL RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A recent writer on the problem of freedom has declared it to be one of the most confused and complicated problems in the entire field of philosophy.[1] This confusion may, as he suggests, be accounted for both by the number of human interests concerned and by the history of the problem. Freedom has been discussed from the most diverse angles. Sometimes it has been regarded as primarily a psychological problem; again, its intimate relation to problems of the moral life has been stressed; at various other times, its implications for metaphysics, for religion, for science, or for social theory have been in the forefront of attention. A short sketch, therefore, of the history of the problem may serve to bring out its many-sidedness and to introduce us to contemporary conceptions of freedom.

In the earliest period of their philosophical reflection, the Greeks, with a naïve trust in reason, busied themselves with problems of the cosmos, giving little consideration to specifically human issues. But the divergence of their world views eventually forced them to raise the question of the nature and possibility of knowledge, and this inevitably led on to many other questions concerning the nature of man. This emphasis upon specifically human problems was accentuated by contemporary social conditions. Old customs, old rites were being discarded,

[1] Cf. Windelband, *Über Willensfreiheit*, Chap. I.

and the very foundations of law and of society were being subjected to critical examination. The individual came into prominence. Great impetus was given to the study of psychology and rhetoric by the fact that leadership might be secured through their means. Such conditions as these favored the rise of the Sophists. The humanistic and individualistic bent of these thinkers would, one might suppose, quite naturally have led them to affirm the fact of freedom. Whether or not they taught this doctrine, however, we cannot determine; there is no conclusive evidence that they gave serious or careful consideration to it. So far as our present knowledge goes, it was Socrates who first definitely and explicitly maintained the reality of freedom. For this early philosopher, freedom referred primarily to the character of the act. The act that was good was also free; man was free whenever he chose the good. In Socrates' opinion evil is always involuntary, being due solely to ignorance.[2] This identification of freedom with good action was accepted also by Plato. Like his master, Plato often asserted that man never sinned voluntarily.[3] In apparent contradiction to this teaching, however, Plato also declared that man was free to choose either good *or* evil.[4] Thus, for Plato, freedom denoted not only virtuous or wise action, but also the possibility of choice. To Aristotle, it was this psychological aspect of freedom that was of paramount interest. Believing that responsibility involves genuine freedom of choice, he undertook a painstaking analysis of volition.[5] By this means he showed that evil resulted from habit and training as well as from ignorance, and that ignorance itself was often voluntary. Aristotle's affirmation of the reality of freedom of choice

[2] Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Bk. IV, 6, 6; Bk. III, 9, 4–5.

[3] Cf. *Protagoras*, 345 E, 358 C; *Republic*, Bk. VII, 535 E; *Timæus*, 86; *Meno*, 77 D; *Sophist*, 230 A.

[4] Cf. *Laws*, Bk. X, 904 b; *Republic*, Bk. X, 617 e; Phædo, 80 E.

[5] Cf. *Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk. III, 1–5.

is in harmony with the general tendency of his metaphysics. It accords well with his emphasis upon the individual, and with his admission of contingency as well as of rigid teleology in the cosmos. Plato's acceptance of freedom, on the contrary, seems to conflict with his emphasis upon the universal, as well as with the monistic tendency of his philosophy. However, both Plato and Aristotle practically ignored the metaphysical implications of freedom, confining their discussions to its psychological and ethical aspects.

The credit for first centering attention upon the metaphysical aspect of the problem of freedom belongs to the Stoics and the Epicureans. This historical fact cannot be completely explained, yet there are certain considerations that throw some light upon it. The foundation for such a discussion had been laid by the work of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Moreover, the decline of Greek supremacy had thrown the Greek back upon himself so that he realized the significance of his own personality as never before. Furthermore, in being freed from some of the artificial limitations of national existence, he became cosmopolitan in his outlook, and was led to the problem of the relation of his life to the universe as a whole. Thus he was confronted with the task of reconciling his new-found individuality with his view of the ultimate nature of the universe. The Stoics, to be sure, never reached a completely consistent solution of this problem. On the one hand, they regarded the universe as completely rational, and as determined by eternal and necessary laws. From this point of view, they subordinated the individual to the whole, and consequently denied freedom in the sense of contingency.[6] On the other hand, they exalted man's self-dependence, stoutly affirming that man's will was so completely in his own power, that not even Zeus could overthrow it.[7] The aim of the

[6] Cf. *Diogenes Lærtes*, Bk. VII, lxxii-lxxiv; Cicero, *De Fato*, xvii; Antoninus, *Meditations*, IV, 26; V, 8; VIII, 5; X, 5; XII, 26.

[7] Cf. Epictetus, Disc., Bk. I, 1; see also Cicero, *De Fato*, XVIII.

Stoics was, of course, to deny freedom as contingency, but to establish it as the *willing* submission of the wise man to the eternal and rational order of nature. In opposition to this teaching the Epicureans maintained freedom in the sense of sheer contingency. This contingency, moreover, they predicated of atoms as well as of men, and made one of the fundamental principles of their cosmology.[8] Thus, then, there are here brought face to face, the view that freedom consists in rational or ethical self-determination, and the assertion that it involves contingency or chance—two conceptions which are still hotly contested in recent discussions of the problem of freedom.

The later teachings of both Stoicism and Epicureanism are tinged with a religious coloring. This religious aspect appears even more clearly in Neo-Platonism, and in Patristic Philosophy. The change which thus took place in the character of philosophical thought emerged from a number of causes. It was due in part to the fact that the conflicts between the various speculative systems and the failure of any to give complete satisfaction bred a distrust of reason. Man longed for salvation. He could not, however, find it in traditional religion, for he no longer believed in the gods of his fathers, nor could he seem to attain it in any of the current systems of thought. The religious longing of the period, moreover, was rendered more intense by the contact of the Occidental with the Oriental mind. Through this contact, Greek and Roman became imbued with a feeling of awe and wonder at the mystery of life, and with a desire for the supernatural. Inevitably this change of feeling reflected itself in the discussion of all problems. The question of freedom came to be centered upon the relation of the soul of the individual to the supreme source of all beauty and goodness. For example, in the philosophy of Plotinos,[9] freedom

[8] Cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, Bk. I, 25; Lucretius, *De Rerum Naturæ*, Bk. II, 251–293.

[9] Cf. Plotinos, *Enneads*, III, 2; IV, 3, 8; VI, 4, 8, 15.

consists in the ability of the soul either to turn from "the Good" or steadfastly to seek the good and to strive to return to the One whence it came. Although such freedom on the part of the individual seems incompatible with Plotinos' complete monism, he was constrained to admit it as an explanation of the existence of evil and of moral striving. He taught also that man attains true freedom only in so far as he becomes one with the Good.

The religious note, however strong in neo-platonic thought, was even more dominant in Patristic Philosophy. The early Christian Fathers, in working out their theology, inevitably took over many of the conceptions and problems of the contemporaneous philosophical systems. These conceptions and problems, however, were necessarily altered by being brought into relation with Christian beliefs. Not infrequently new motives for their discussion were brought into play. Such was the case with freedom. Certain elements in Christianity urgently demanded its affirmation. In the first place, Christianity not merely continued the Jewish emphasis on conscience, sin, and responsibility, but it stressed to quite a novel degree the value and significance of the individual. In the second place, it regarded God as supremely Good, and could not therefore make Him responsible for evil. Thus, the early Christian Fathers, like Plotinos, eagerly affirmed freedom as the explanation of evil.[10] Yet there were motives in Christianity which led in the opposite direction. As the church organization became stronger, the individual dwindled in importance. With the development of Christian theology, moreover, the difficulty of reconciling individual freedom with God's omnipotence and with the doctrine of salvation as a gift of grace became ever more apparent. Hence it was that Augustine,

[10] Cf. Tertullian, *De Anima*, Chaps. XXXIX–XLI; Clement, *Pædagogus*, Bk. I, Chaps. I, II and XIII, passim; Origen, *De Principiis*, III, 1, 18–19; *Contra Celsum*, IV, 3.

in spite of an express affirmation of freedom,[11] declared that God could control man's will, and that He elected whom He would for salvation.[12] This view of God's election was, of course, not peculiar to Augustine. It was a common, though a disputed, teaching in the Church, and found its way into Protestant theology through the teachings of Calvin [13] and Zwingli.

The doctrine that election depends solely on the Divine will raises the question of the nature of God's volition. According to Augustine, God's will must be regarded as absolutely free in the extreme sense of arbitrary or indifferent, since His choice cannot be motivated by any merit or particular characteristics of the individual. The same general problem was raised even more clearly a few centuries later in the famous controversy between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The former maintained that God's will is determined by his reason, while the latter contended that it is determined by itself alone. According to the one, God chooses a thing because it is good; according to the other, it is good because He so chooses.[14] The large importance of the theological interest in medieval philosophy should not blind us to the fact that many of its problems have also a purely human aspect and reference. Thomas's discussion of the relation between will and reason concerned not merely God's will, but human volition as well. The problem thus raised is still as pressing as ever, and is fundamental to the discussion of freedom.

With the Renaissance there came a change in the general direction of philosophy. The causes and characteristics

[11] Cf. *Nature and Grace*, 32; *Grace and Free Will*, Chap. II; *City of God*, Bk. V, Chaps. IX–X; Bk. XI, Chap. XVII.

[12] Cf. *Rebuke and Grace*, Chap. XXVIII; *City of God*, Bk. XIV, Chap. XI; *Nature and Grace*, Chap. XXV; *Grace and Free Will*, Chaps. X, XX.

[13] Cf. Calvin, *Institutes*, Bk. III, 11, 22.

[14] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Part I, XXIII, 3d article; Duns Scotus, *Oxon.* III, Chap. 119.

of this change have been so often discussed that we need not recite them in this connection. Suffice it to say that, in the early days of modern philosophy, reason and the method of the mathematical sciences were so in the ascendant that the will was relegated to a subordinate position. Philosophy consequently acquired a monistic tendency. As a result, the value and significance of the finite individual were imperilled, and human freedom was denied. It is true that Descartes affirmed the reality of freedom and used it in explanation of error.[15] Yet he failed to reconcile this affirmation either with his belief in God's omnipotence, or (what was of more significance for the subsequent development of philosophy) with his metaphysical teaching concerning the dependence of every finite substance upon the Infinite Substance. This latter teaching was carried out to its logical conclusion by Spinoza. In his case, it resulted in a complete monism that involved the absolute necessity of law and precluded the existence of freedom as contingency.[16] In spite of Spinoza's deterministic conclusion, many of his statements at least imply the reality of genuine freedom of choice. Yet it is plain that he intended to deny contingency absolutely and to maintain freedom only in the sense of completely rational activity. In this deterministic view, Spinoza was at one with the materialist Hobbes. Hobbes likewise taught that freedom was opposed, not to necessity, but to external constraint, and that man's volition, like all other facts of the universe, was completely determined and necessary.[17]

An attempt to rescue man from the chain of necessity was made in the philosophy of Leibniz. This philosophy broke with the Spinozistic monism, and, by its emphasis on activity and individuality, led naturally to an affirma-

[15] Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, IV; *Principles*, Part I, Props. XXXIV–XXXIX.

[16] Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Props. xvi, xvii; Part V.

[17] Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. 21, Part 2.

tion of the reality of freedom. Leibniz distinguished carefully between ethical and metaphysical freedom, but accepted them both. The former, he declared, admits of degrees, and, in its highest degree, is characteristic of God alone. The latter consists in a denial of necessity, and is the attribute of will as such.[18] Yet Leibniz' affirmation of freedom was not consistently carried through. It came into an apparently irreconcilable conflict with his doctrine of pre-established harmony. Leibniz tried, it is true, to avoid this contradiction by analyzing the meaning of 'possible,' and by contrasting contingent facts with necessary truths.[19] He, however, did not succeed in showing that a thing is genuinely possible because it and its opposite are alike conceivable, nor that two alternatives can really be possible if all is predetermined. Furthermore, nothing is gained by the isolation of individuals and by the emphasis on consciousness so long as the succession of psychical states is regarded as predetermined. A conscious automaton is, as Kant said, none the less an automaton.[20]

Meanwhile an attempt was being made to solve the problem of freedom empirically. It was on the ground of experience that Locke was led to maintain the reality of freedom of choice. He asserted that "So far as a man has power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind; so far is a man free." [21] He objected to the term freedom of the will on the ground that freedom or liberty belongs to the agent and not to the will. Later empirical discussions of freedom utilized a distinction that had already been made between freedom as opposed to constraint and freedom as opposed to necessity. The former, more

[18] Cf. Leibniz, *New Essays*, Bk. II, Chap. XXI; Duncan's Ed., XXVII; Gerhardt's Ed., I, p. 331.

[19] Cf. Duncan's Ed., XXVI, XXX; *New Essays*, Bk. IV, Chap. VI.

[20] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Bk. I, Chap. III (Abbott Ed., p. 195).

[21] *Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Chap. 21, 8; cf. also the whole chapter passim.

accessible to direct observation, was held in many instances to constitute the very essence of freedom. Thus the term freedom commonly came to have the purely negative connotation of absence of constraint.[22] This conception played an important part not only in the history of thought, but also in the world of political and social affairs. It was the fundamental concept of the extreme individualism of the eighteenth century and was the watchword of revolutionists and reformers. It secured a lasting embodiment in the American Constitution and in the Bills of Rights of the American States and of France. Indeed, it is still influential in much of our thinking concerning the function of government. Although this emphasis on the negative aspect of freedom was perhaps a necessary accompaniment of the attempt to free the individual from the absolutism of both state and church, the inadequacy of such freedom was proved by the course of social events. It was discredited by the changes resulting from the industrial revolution and from the evils growing out of the laissez-faire policy. The theoretical insufficiency of the merely negative concept of freedom was disclosed by the work of the German Idealists and of the English Hegelians. But before we can see the force of their criticisms, we must turn to the philosophy of Kant.

Kant introduced a distinctly new element into the discussion of freedom. His critique of the theoretical reason aimed to show that science could not dispose of the problem.[23] This made possible the affirmation of freedom on the ground of the demands of the moral life.[24] In this manner there were introduced considerations of *value*

[22] Cf. Hume, *Enquiry*, Sect. VIII; cf. also the views of Mill, Bentham, and Spencer.

[23] Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface to 2d ed., Part II, Division II; Müller, pp. 362 ff., 432 ff.

[24] Cf. Kant, *Metaphysic of Morals*, Sect. III; Abbott, pp. 66 ff; *Critique of the Practical Reason*, Bk. I, Chap. III, Abbott ed., pp. 165 ff., 182 ff.

and *worth* as well as of mere existence. Kant, moreover, worked out the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the temporal and the non-temporal. However much the resulting account of freedom may have failed to attain complete consistency,[25] Kant nevertheless blazed the trial which subsequent philosophers have in large numbers followed.

The successors of Kant, disagreeing in their interpretation of the critical philosophy, were led to somewhat divergent doctrines concerning freedom. Fichte, like Kant, regarded freedom as the postulate of the moral consciousness. He went further and made it the very basis of his metaphysics.[26] The emphasis on moral obligation, moreover, led him to a recognition of the contrast between the ideal and the actual, and to an exaltation of the ideal. When we come to Hegel, we meet with an essentially different spirit. Whatever their points of agreement may be, Hegel presents, in opposition to the extreme voluntarism of Fichte, an absolute rationalism. Hegel, however, did not deny the reality of freedom. Rather should it be said that he developed the distinction made by Kant and Fichte between the empirical and the transcendental self, and predicated freedom of the latter. Like Fichte, furthermore, he regarded the transcendental self as the absolute or universal self. He conceived the finite self to be free only in so far as the finite identified his life with the life of the whole. The concrete expression of his freedom was found not in his capricious activity—his mere ability to do as he pleased—but in his lawful activity as a member of the state.[27]

The conception of freedom as characteristic of an in-

[25] Kant sometimes implied that the rational self alone was free, while at other times he taught that the self could choose either good or evil. There are serious difficulties too, as has frequently been pointed out, in the conception of transcendental freedom.

[26] Fichte, *Vocation of Man*, Bk. III, Open Court Ed., pp. 99 ff.; *Science of Rights*, Part I, Bk. I., Sämmtliche Werke, I, pp. 263 ff.

[27] Cf. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Introduction.

dividual regarded as a member of a social whole was imported into England by Green, as a corrective of those theories which interpreted freedom in the purely negative sense of absence of constraint. The Hegelian conception was in harmony with the new social consciousness, and found ready adoption on the part of many English thinkers. It seemed, indeed, as though the problem of freedom were nearing a satisfactory solution, and as though freedom would henceforth be regarded as the rational activity of the social self as a member of the Absolute. Nevertheless, certain counter-tendencies remained, and in recent years especially, the absolutists' view of freedom has been assailed from many quarters.

The development of science has seemed to many to insure the victory of determinism. By its constant reliance upon the category of mechanical causation, science apparently leaves no place for freedom within its domain. Hence the extension of its field over the realms of life and consciousness has been viewed with alarm by upholders of freedom, who have felt that freedom was being crowded back into smaller and smaller areas, and that eventually it was likely to disappear completely. Yet purely mechanistic determinism has no new category to offer, and still fails to meet the Kantian critique.

The greatest light thrown by science in recent years on the problem of freedom undoubtedly proceeds from the doctrine of evolution. The thought of evolution is, of course, a very ancient one. Yet it exercised neither a profound nor a wide influence upon human thought until the publication of the *Origin of Species*. At first it seemed that evolution might disprove freedom by bringing fresh evidence in support of mechanism. It is now evident, however, that the theory has implications which lead in the opposite direction. The genetic method, brought into favor by an acceptance of evolution, has shown that mechanical causation of itself does not afford an adequate description of development or growth.

Many thinkers, moreover, have maintained that the reality of time and of change, involved in the doctrine of evolution, is inconsistent with a belief in universal mechanism. This contention, indeed, forms the basis for many recent arguments in favor of freedom.

Added to the above is a second set of considerations. The study of genetic, abnormal, and social psychology has disclosed the influence of non-rational factors in man's experience. It is an established fact that such factors play a rôle even in the case of thinking and that conduct is ordinarily determined by habit, imitation, suggestion, or emotion, rather than by reason. As a result there has, in many quarters, appeared a reaction against rationalism, along with an adoption of some form either of voluntarism or of intuitionism. In both cases there are involved motives for a renewed insistence upon freedom.

In the third place, the growth of democracy has focussed attention upon the value of every individual as such. To be sure, the democratic movement has also been accompanied by a continually increasing complexity in modern life. Out of this complexity a vast system of interrelations has arisen, and this has sometimes threatened to engulf the individual. Yet individualism is by no means dead. It still raises its protest against those who would reduce man to a mere cog in a social and industrial machine, or to an expression of the Absolute.

For these and many other less important reasons, freedom is once more being discussed with avidity, there being many motives, new as well as old, and many points of view. It would seem profitable, therefore, to undertake a critical survey of the most typical among the recent doctrines concerning freedom. In view of the great diversity of such doctrines, there is some difficulty in singling out those which may be regarded as most representative. Our aim has been so to select them as to bring out as clearly as possible the different logical principles underlying the various discussions.

We thus consider first a denial of freedom from the point of view of a purely naturalistic philosophy. As representative of this tendency, we have selected Ernst Haeckel, inasmuch as his writings have attained wide popularity and influence. In his exaltation of mechanical causation as the sole explanatory principle of the universe, Haeckel represents the view of many present day scientists and psychologists.

As embodying the view logically antithetical to that of Haeckel, the doctrine of William James is next discussed. Of all modern protagonists of freedom, James asserts its reality in the most uncompromising manner. Rather than be deluded by any form of "soft determinism," he regards freedom as sheer chance. Hence he beings out in a thoroughgoing fashion, the various implications of freedom as contingency. His discussion, moreover, bears witness to many of the different tendencies in modern life and thought that lead to freedom. It is motivated by a democratic appreciation of individuality, by a Western exaltation of action, by a rugged and courageous attitude toward life, by an heroic acceptance of the demands of morality, and by a constant insistence upon the reality of time.

Our consideration of James' conception is followed by a study of Bergson's view. Like the philosophy of James, the thought of Bergson exemplifies the tendency to emphasize time and activity, and to exalt immediacy at the expense of conceptual thinking. Bergson's treatment of freedom does not perhaps involve any logical principle not present in James' teaching. It cannot, however, well be omitted from any discussion of contemporary conceptions of freedom, since it is often regarded as the most conclusive and triumphant vindication of freedom in modern thought. For Bergson, indeed, freedom is the very principle of all life and activity, and thus discloses the inmost nature of reality.

As an interesting supplement to the more or less natu-

ralistic views of James and Bergson, the spiritualistic conception of freedom maintained by James Ward is next examined. Ward's discussion is motivated throughout by a desire to do full justice to human personality, without losing sight of its relation to God as creative spirit and world ground. Thus Ward is influenced by motives which were dominant in patristic and medieval philosophy, which affected the view of Leibniz and Descartes, which profoundly influenced German Idealism, and which indeed are operative in any attempt to work out a conception of man that shall do justice at one and the same time to his moral, religious, and philosophical demands.

Our study is concluded by a consideration of Bosanquet's conception of freedom. The principal motive in this case is the desire for complete rationality. Bosanquet is thus led directly to monism. Hence his conception serves to furnish light on the question whether monism is compatible with the reality of freedom. For Bosanquet, as for the Stoics, for Spinoza, and for the Neo-Kantian Idealists, freedom is equivalent not to contingency but to rational self-expression, i. e., to the self-transcending activity of the individual as an expression of the Absolute.

Our discussion of recent conceptions of freedom advances no claim of indicating a satisfactory solution of the problem. Its aim is the much humbler one of analyzing the question and of exhibiting the logical implications inherent in various recent treatments of it.

CHAPTER II

HAECKEL'S DENIAL OF FREEDOM

I

"The great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist, between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day, after more than two thousand years, completely in favor of the determinist. The human will has no more freedom than that of the higher animals, from which it differs only in degree, not in kind. We now know that each act of the will is as fatally determined by the organization of the individual and as dependent on the momentary condition of his environment as every other psychic activity." [28]

Haeckel's categorical denial of freedom, as thus expressed, proceeds from his general world-view. This world-view is based on the doctrine of evolution and on the belief in the universality of the "law of substance." The former leads Haeckel to a materialistic conclusion; the latter, to a mechanistic determinism. Our first task, therefore, will be to consider the question whether the existence of a spiritual principle is precluded by evolution, or by any other consideration suggested by Haeckel. We shall then proceed to the question of the universality of the "law of substance" and to the problem of its relation to mechanism. Finally, we shall examine briefly the adequacy of mechanism itself as a philosophic explanation of the universe.

II

Haeckel never tires of citing facts in support of the doctrine of evolution. Since this doctrine, in some form or other, is now almost universally accepted as true, we need

[28] *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 130 f.

not in this connection stop to inquire concerning the adequacy of the evidence which Haeckel adduces in its support. The only question for us to consider is whether the doctrine of evolution inevitably leads, as Haeckel sometimes argues, to the reduction of mind to matter. Put very simply, Haeckel's argument for this conclusion is that, since man developed from the lowest forms of life, there is no reason to attribute to him a separate immaterial or spiritual principle not found in the forms of life from which he originated. Many objections to this argument at once suggest themselves. It takes for granted the old scholastic idea of rigid continuity according to which nothing new can ever arise. Now there are grave difficulties in this view. Even waiving these for the moment, however, Haeckel's conclusion by no means follows. Rather, the doctrine of continuity, if strictly held, would force him to ascribe to the lowest organism all the capacities and meanings which have appeared in the highest forms of life. For, on the assumption of rigid continuity, the very fact that certain phenomena such as sensation and will have developed in the later stages of the evolutionary process, would show that these phenomena were implicit in the earlier forms of life. Thus, Haeckel would be compelled to understand the protozoa in the light of man, rather than to reduce man to the level of a protozoan. Sometimes, indeed, he seems to do this. With an amazing anthropomorphism he, on occasion, bestows elementary will and elementary emotion upon even inanimate matter.[29] If he held consistently to this view, his system would be in the nature of a teleological hylozoism rather than of a mechanical determinism. As has already been suggested, however, this reading of continuity—this attribution of man's processes to the lower forms of life—is misleading. It involves what Baldwin calls "the fallacy of the implicit." As a matter of fact, if progress is genuine, there must arise new proc-

[29] Cf. *infra*, p. 26.

esses and new meanings which cannot be interpreted solely in terms of the earlier. Thus, even though life has arisen from the inanimate, and consciousness from the unconscious, they must be recognized as possessing certain essentially novel characteristics. It is fallacious either to read them back as implicit in the earlier stages or to reduce them to the level of the latter and thus deny them. Hence the doctrine of evolution in no wise militates against the spiritual nature of man. Rather it carries a presumption that man's nature is not only more developed but higher than the merely physical or the merely biological.

In addition to the argument drawn from evolution, Haeckel adduces several other considerations in support of his denial of the spiritual nature of man. He brings forward the evidence of experiments which have shown that various functions of the "soul," such as speech and sense images, are connected with definite areas of the cortex of the brain, and that they disappear when these areas are diseased or destroyed.[30] Again, he calls our attention to the close connection between man's higher cerebral functions and purely physiological processes—a connection especially striking in the case of emotions.[31] Furthermore, he insists that there are certain facts connected with the individual's development which indicate that the "soul" originates, grows, and decays with the body.[32] Finally, he points out that in not a single instance do we have knowledge of a spiritual principle unconnected with a physical substrate.[33]

These various considerations do indeed show clearly that there is some relation between mind and body. They do not, however, lead to a reduction of mind to body.

[30] Cf. *Last Words on Evolution*, pp. 98 f.; *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 204.

[31] Cf. *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 127, 204.

[32] Cf. *ibid.*, Chap. VIII.

[33] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 90, 91.

The facts can be read as easily the other way. As a matter of fact, we are as conscious of the influence of mind on body as of body on mind. It is true that illness or various physical causes affect man's mental processes, but it is no less obvious that man's mental processes affect his physical condition. Indeed, every act of will is evidence of the power of mind over matter. To this Haeckel might retort, "What you call will is merely a certain functioning of a physiological organism. I can even disclose to you, with my microscope, the minute structures in the brain by which willing takes place." But can Haeckel prove his point in this manner? The brain with its various structures may be, not the *cause* of mind, but the instrument of mind's expression.[34] Moreover, the very facts of pathology which are cited by Haeckel to show the dependence of mind on matter are used by Bergson to prove that mind cannot be located in the brain, nor be determined by it.[35] Furthermore, in this controversy concerning the relation of mind and body, does it not devolve upon men like Haeckel to meet the Berkeleian retort, "The brain, the nervous system, etc., to which you attempt to reduce mind, are known only as ideas of mind, and cannot be proved to exist apart from mind?"

Haeckel's arguments frequently betray a misunderstanding of his opponent's position. They are all directed against the conception of a separate, immaterial substance or soul. Most idealists, however, regard the soul as activity or functioning, rather than as substance. They do not insist on the separateness of the psychic principle, or on the existence of any disembodied spirit, but rather on the fact that human experience cannot be explained in purely physical or physiological terms. Haeckel maintains that the soul represents but the "sum total of physiological functions." The problem of the activity of the

[34] Cf. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, pp. 293 ff.; Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 299 ff.; James, *Human Immortality*, pp. 7–29.

[35] Cf. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Chap. II.

soul, however, is not thereby solved. Consciousness is a fundamental fact of experience, and it cannot be explained by being set aside, or labelled an epiphenomenon. The materialist must explain not only how the body reacts, but how it is conscious, how it thinks, evaluates, loves, struggles, and sacrifices. It is indeed questionable whether this activity can be interpreted in purely biological or physiological terms. The so-called body becomes equivalent to the mind, and demands the same sort of an explanation.

We conclude, then, from this discussion that Haeckel's reduction of the psychical to the physical is not valid, and we turn to an examination of the "law of substance"—the second main support of Haeckel's system.

III

The "law of substance" is a combination of the well-known scientific laws of the "conservation of matter" and the conservation of energy." According to Haeckel, these latter laws are but two aspects of the one great cosmic law, since they relate to the two inseparable attributes of substance.[36] In passing, it may be noted that little is gained by this combination of the two laws, inasmuch as the conception of 'Substance' fails to make intelligible the relation between matter and energy. Haeckel, however, regards the "law of substance" as the one great eternal cosmic law. On what evidence then can he base its validity?

The evidence for the law lies in the realm of scientific experiment. Thus, the law of "conservation of energy" rests on the fact that many experiments have shown that when one form of energy is changed into another, the latter may be reconverted into the former with only a slight loss, due to the escape of part of the energy into an unavailable form. Similarly, the law of the conservation of matter rests on experiments which have demonstrated

[36] Cf. *The Riddle of the Universe*, Chap. XII.

that the weight of a substance does not change throughout a series of chemical transformations. Moreover, no experiments have given any indication of the creation or destruction of matter or of energy. That the generalization of a great number of phenomena under the laws in discussion must indeed be regarded as a great achievement on the part of science no one should in the least doubt. Yet it is one thing to regard these laws as generalizations useful and valid for the purposes of science, and quite another to erect them into ontological and absolutely universal laws. Against this latter proceeding, which is that of Haeckel, an emphatic protest must be made. For this protest there are three grounds: first, the laws have never been proved to hold exactly in any field; second, the fact that the laws appear to hold in one or two fields is no justification for the assertion that they must hold in all fields; third, experience can never *prove* the absolute universality of any law.

In the first place, it is manifestly impossible to prove that the laws hold exactly in any field, since the inaccuracy of scientific instruments is such that *small* differences might pass unnoted. Furthermore, there are always extraneous circumstances which must be taken into account in an appraisal of the results of an experiment. A scientific result is always an approximation. The scientific law states what would take place under ideal circumstances rather than what occurs in any concrete situation.

In the second place, the fact that the laws appear to hold true within certain fields of our experience does not show that they *must* hold universally. Thus the demonstration of the laws in the case of physical and chemical changes, would furnish no proof of their applicability to psychical changes. It is at this point that Haeckel's assertion of the universality of the law depends upon his reduction of the psychical to the physical. Since this is not valid, he is not entitled, without more ado, to extend the application of the law to conscious processes. The

application of the law here must rest upon experiments showing that a certain amount of physical energy can be transformed into consciousness or "psychic energy," and reconverted into approximately the original amount of physical energy as mechanical energy can be converted into heat. Manifest difficulties stand in the way of such experimentation, but until something of the sort is carried out, there is little significance in speaking of the psychical life as a form of energy. To do so merely covers up the fact of our ignorance concerning the relation between psychical and physical changes. Now apparently Haeckel himself is aware of some of the difficulties in the way of regarding the psychic as a form of energy, since in his last work he explicitly teaches, contrary to many of his previous assertions, that the psychic is a separate attribute of substance, co-ordinate with matter and energy.[37] If this were admitted, however, the psychic, to come under the law of substance, would demand its own law of the "conservation of the psychic." In any case, the important point for our purpose is, that until the law is proved to be valid in the psychical field, it furnishes no ground for a denial of freedom.

Our last objection needs no justification, as it is a philosophic commonplace that laws resting on experience can be universalized only by means of the supposition of the uniformity of nature. This uniformity, however, cannot be proved by experience without the assumption of its own existence in the attempted proof. Thus, the observation that the laws apparently hold in a comparatively few instances within the narrow range of our experience, is no proof that they have always held and will always hold throughout the length and breadth of the universe.

We have seen reason to question the dogmatic assertion of the universality of the law of substance. Yet, if it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the law is univer-

[37] Cf. *Die Lebenswunder*, p. 185. Contrast with *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 220, and *Anthropogenie*, p. 941.

sal and necessary, it by no means follows that this law alone gives an adequate account of reality, and a solution of all its riddles. The law is an abstraction: it is purely quantitative, and, as such, leaves out of account the qualitative aspects of the universe. Thus, although the *amount* of matter and energy in the universe remain constant, yet changes in their form or in their combination bring about new qualities, not reducible to mere quantity. Take, for example, the case of a chemist who combines two or more elements. Their weight remains constant throughout the chemical transformation. Yet this quantitative equality in no wise describes the changes in color, odor, and in other qualities that have occurred. These qualitative aspects, however, although they cannot be described by the law of substance nor comprehended in a system which uses this law as the solution of all its problems, are nevertheless real.

Haeckel regards the law of substance as inseparably bound up with mechanical causation.[38] The relationship between the two is, however, not so simple nor so self-evident as he would have us believe. The law of substance, he tells us, is a consequence of mechanical causation, yet his proof of the latter rests largely on his supposed proof of the universality of the former. Now, the law of mechanical causation, involving the equivalence of past and present, might lead naturally, though perhaps not inevitably, to the law of substance. On the other hand, the law of substance does not necessarily involve mechanical causation. It does indeed preclude absolute spontaneity, but it would be as compatible with teleology as with mechanism, since it says nothing concerning the origin of changes in matter or energy. The amount of energy and matter in the universe might remain constant if their changes were due to something akin to desire as well as if they were due to a *vis a tergo*. Thus, even the universality of the "law of substance" would not prove the

[38] Cf. *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 215, 366.

universality of mechanism. The latter theory must stand on its own feet, and be accepted or rejected on its own merits.

IV

Haeckel declares that mechanical causation is adequate for the explanation of all phenomena. To quote his own words, "The great abstract law of mechanical causality, of which our cosmological law—the law of substance—is but another and a concrete expression, now rules the entire universe, as it does the mind of man; it is the steady, immovable pole-star, whose clear light falls on our path through the dark labyrinth of the countless separate phenomena." [39] "The monism of the cosmos which we establish thereon proclaims the absolute dominion of 'the great eternal iron laws' throughout the universe. It thus shatters, at the same time, the three central dogmas of the dualistic philosophy—the personality of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will."[40] Before accepting Haeckel's conclusion concerning freedom, we must examine the adequacy of mechanism itself.

The doctrine of universal mechanism has been repeatedly challenged, and many significant objections have been urged against it. Of these objections, however, we shall stress only the following: first, the universality of mechanism cannot be proved; second, the universality of mechanical causation would not, as Haeckel would have us believe, necessarily preclude purpose and rational or ethical freedom; third, mechanism by itself fails to give a satisfactory account of experience as we actually know it.

We contend that mechanism cannot be proved. Experience cannot show that mechanical causation is universal and necessary, and reason does not disclose any logical necessity for insisting that every aspect of reality shall be explained by reference to the past. On the contrary, the concept of mechanical causation is full of difficulties which

[39] *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 366. [40] *Ibid.*, p. 381.

force the mind beyond it.[41] The universality of mechanical causation is indeed a useful methodological postulate of science, but not necessarily a universal principle of reality. Haeckel makes many dogmatic assertions to the effect that mechanism is universal, and that even the will is absolutely bound by the causal law. Yet obviously he cannot *prove* that such is the case. He cannot *prove* that A did a certain act because A had a certain heredity and a certain environment, and that A could not have done anything else. Indeed in the case of human activities, there are so many complex factors that it is practically impossible to isolate any set of conditions in such a way as to establish a uniform series of cause and effect. Thus, psychology finds it difficult to use the scientific methods found fruitful in other fields, and has not yet succeeded in establishing a uniform causal connection between mental phenomena. The possibility therefore remains that mental processes may resist such causal treatment.

In the second place, even though mechanism were proved to be universal, this would by no means preclude the possibility of purpose, of value, and of rational or ethical freedom. Haeckel's own absolute denial of all distinctions of value is evident in the following quotations: "As our earth is a mere speck in the sunbeam in the illimitable universe, so man himself is but a tiny grain of protoplasm in the perishable framework of organic nature." [42] "Our own 'human nature,' which exalted itself into an image of God in its anthropistic illusion, sinks to the level of a placental mammal, which has no more value for the universe at large than the ant, the fly of a summer's day, the microscopic infusorium, or the smallest bacillus. Humanity is but a transitory phase of the evolution of an eternal substance, a particular phenom-

[41] For a careful analysis of causation, cf. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, pp. 158–90; Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 273 ff.; Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 199–221.

[42] *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 14.

enal form of matter and energy, the true proportion of which we soon perceive when we set it on the background of infinite space and eternal time." [43] From Haeckel's point of view neither man nor the bacillus can have any value for the "universe at large," since there is, in his opinion, no purpose whatsoever in the universe. All is but the result of blind forces, [44] and even the progress of evolution is of no value to the universe. Now this denial of value is explained by the fact that Haeckel always associates teleology with a separate immaterial principle. He regards it as an interruption of mechanical causation, and so feels that it is incompatible with monism. Whether or not we shall find that an absolute monism of any sort is compatible with distinctions of value, and with freedom, at least it is plain that the denial of teleology does not necessarily follow from the establishment of mechanical causation. Mechanism, as many teleologists tell us, may be the instrument of purpose. Far from being antagonistic to teleology, it alone makes teleology possible. Without it, purpose would be impotent. For example—to take an analogy from human life—man can utilize natural processes for the carrying out of his purposes, only in so far as he can rely upon their mechanical uniformity. Even a machine is an embodiment of purpose. It works in a mechanical way, but its construction can be explained only in terms of purpose. Teleology is not necessarily an external principle opposed to mechanism. It may be conceived as immanent in all natural processes, as including and transcending their merely mechanical aspects. From such a point of view the processes of the universe are describable in terms of mechanical causation, but these series of mechanical changes are what they are by reference to their value for the whole.

Again, we object to mechanism taken as the sole explanation of the universe on the ground that it fails to take into account many important facts of experience.

[43] *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 244. [44] Cf. *ibid.* Chap. XIII.

Although supposed to be the direct outcome of an acceptance of evolution, mechanism has been unable to give a satisfactory explanation of evolution itself. Furthermore, mechanism cannot explain the existence of values, purposes, and ideals and many other aspects of reality.

Bergson, perhaps better than anyone else, has succeeded in proving the first of these points. In his careful examination of theories of evolution, he shows that mechanism is forced to take refuge in a miracle whether to account for the successive production and preservation of millions of minute variations in the same direction, or to explain the complementary changes of the various parts of an organ necessary for the preservation and improvement of its functioning. Moreover, this same miracle must be repeated innumerable times as the same change has taken place in many different lines of evolution.[45] Furthermore, no explanation of evolution can dispense with such terms as adaptation, struggle for existence, etc., and these terms, so far from being purely mechanistic, imply purpose, ends, value. The mechanist holds that all achievements of evolution are merely results of external and internal forces, which are absolutely blind. Yet if such is the case, how can it be said that the organism struggles *for* existence? Haeckel himself, indeed, often finds a place for the action of internal forces of a psychical nature, declaring that the movement of molecules is due to an inner will. "Even the atom is not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will, or, as it is better expressed, of feeling and inclination—that is, a universal 'soul' of the simplest character."[46] The term "inclination" suits Haeckel's purpose by its vagueness, but if it is at all comparable to will, it implies a reaching out into the future, which is not explicable as merely the result of a previous force. To do justice to this "inclination," Haeckel would be forced beyond the form of determinism which he espouses.

[45] Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, pp. 62–76.

[46] *The Riddle of the Universe*, p. 229.

The discussion of the inadequacy of mechanism as an account of evolution has led directly to our second criticism, namely, that mechanism fails to do justice to the existence of values and purposes. Such values are present not alone in our inner experience, but find concrete expression in the great achievements of civilization.[47] Surely the painting of a great picture, the writing of a drama, or the founding of a college cannot be accounted for as the result of purely natural forces! The mechanist, of course, does not attempt to deny the presence and power of ideals in human life. His contention is simply that these ideals themselves are the result of purely mechanical forces, and work in a purely mechanical way. Against this claim the testimony of consciousness must be heard. The ideal may be due to preceding conditions of one sort or another, but it does not act upon us as an external compelling force. It is an ideal for us because it appeals to our own interests and purposes and we ourselves select it. This process of the selection of an ideal implies a reaching out to the future, a control, and an organization of life that are distinct from any processes found in the purely physical world and that cannot be described in mechanistic terms.[48]

Haeckel himself grows eloquent over the ideals of the good, the true, and the beautiful, and urges us to put these ideals before any false ideals promulgated by superstition. Such exhortations, however, have apparently little place in an absolutely mechanistic scheme, where each self is absolutely determined by his heredity and environment. Haeckel becomes indignant over what he regards as superstition, yet such indignation is surely not consistent with the recognition that all superstitions as well as the despised dualistic philosophy are, on his scheme, natural products, and are therefore as necessary as his own mo-

[47] Cf. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 109 ff.

[48] For a clear analysis of the distinction between mechanical and personal determination, cf. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 278 ff.

nistic utterances. Furthermore, the ideals of the good, the true, and the beautiful must be, for Haeckel, purely human ideals, since no values exist for the universe. But if man himself has as little value as Haeckel gives him, purely human ideals can hardly be worthy of reverence and worship.

A final word must be added to our criticism of mechanism. The theory of mechanism itself is not, as Haeckel must believe, a purely natural product. It is due to the organizing activity of man's intelligence, and could not exist without it. Haeckel regards this unifying and critical faculty of man as due to the "concatenation of presentations." [49] Yet the mere concatenation of presentations could never of itself lead to the criticism and combination necessary to bring together these various constituents under the law of causation. This unifying of experience demands, as Eucken has so clearly shown, that man be able to separate himself from the chain of nature in order to combine and order the presentations of which he becomes conscious. Hence the formulation of the theory of mechanism is a fact which mechanism itself fails to explain, and the very existence of the theory is evidence of its own inadequacy as a final or complete explanation of the facts in the universe.

We conclude, then, that Haeckel's categorical denial of freedom is not justified. In so far as Haeckel's view is representative of mechanistic determinism, our criticism affects not only his system but also the general mechanistic view. Hence our discussion serves to remove many objections commonly raised against the possibility of freedom, and thus clears the way for a consideration of the arguments of those who maintain the reality or at least the possibility of freedom.

[49] Cf. *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 121 f.

CHAPTER III

JAMES' CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

I

James pleads throughout his writings for a frank recognition of the part that temperament plays in the construction of philosophical systems. He never regards his own philosophy as a dispassionate and unbiased account of reality, but continually represents it as the expression of his own attitude toward the universe. Thus we receive many glimpses of the personality behind the work. If in Haeckel we discover a man blind to many of the facts of human experience, to whom freedom seems but an absurd superstition easily swept away, we find in James one who is profoundly interested in human life and who regards freedom as infinitely desirable. It is easy to discern some of the psychological motives that led James to this position. In the first place, his knowledge and appreciation of human nature were such as to make it impossible for him ever to assent to the view that all human experience is describable in terms of the motion of molecules. His moral vigor, moreover, led him to demand the recognition of the genuineness of human struggle. Again and again he insisted that life loses its dramatic quality and its significance if human activity has no part to play here and now in the destiny of the universe. James' sympathy and interest were not confined, however, to human nature; they went out eagerly to every aspect of the universe. He was scrupulous in his attempt to do justice to the particular character of every fact, refusing assent to any theory that reduced facts to general formulæ in such a way as to rob them of their distinctive and novel aspects. As Dr. Lovejoy has so happily expressed it,

"James was predestined by the possession of what may be called a particularistic mind to be a pluralistic philosopher." [50] A pluralistic conclusion, James believed, is indispensable for an acceptance of freedom.

In keeping with his hatred of dogmatism, James makes no attempt to force his belief in freedom upon others. He does not claim to give a logically cogent demonstration of freedom but merely to show that determinism is not absolutely proved and that it is legitimate to accept, if we will, the fact of freedom. Indeed, he apparently rejoices over the lack of rigid proof, and is glad to leave the decision to the human will. As he puts it, "Our first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free." [51]

II

In James' usage, the term "freedom" connotes radical contingency. In fact, James believes that, in view of the many different meanings and associations of the term 'freedom,' the term 'chance' might well be substituted for it. So conceived, freedom implies discontinuity, novelty, and activity. These various categories are so closely connected in James' teaching that it is difficult to separate them, but it may conduce to clarity to consider them in independence of one another.

Contingency is, as we have said, James' equivalent for freedom. In his opinion, the problem of freedom, complicated as it is by so many issues, can be narrowed down to the question whether contingency is real, i. e., whether genuine alternatives exist. To quote: "The question relates solely to the existence of possibilities, in the strict sense of the term, as things that may, but need not be." [52] "Our sense of 'freedom' supposes that some things at least are decided here and now, that the passing moment

[50] *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 21, p. 137.
[51] *The Will to Believe*, p. 146.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

may contain some novelty, be an original starting-point of events, and not merely transmit a push from elsewhere. We imagine that in some respects at least the future may not be co-implicated with the past, but may be really addable to it, and indeed addable in one shape *or* another, so that the next turn in events can at any given moment genuinely be ambiguous, i. e., possibly this, but also possibly that." [53]

Obviously this question of the reality of alternatives can never be settled by an appeal to facts, for experience can tell what happens—not what might have happened. The solution of the problem must depend then on other sorts of evidence.[54] At once rationalists pronounce the verdict that there can be but one answer to the question inasmuch as the existence of genuine alternatives is inconceivable. This verdict is concurred in by scientists like Haeckel, on the ground of the universality of the causal law, and by absolutists because of the fact that, in a rational and logical system, each part must be conditioned by its relation to the whole. To both these sorts of determinists, James has two replies. First, the claim either of the universality of the causal law or of the necessary relation of every particular to the universe as a whole is not proved. Second, the rationality of the given act can be determined only after the act is performed. Before that time, the other alternative seemed equally logical. This latter argument of James does not, however, go to the heart of the rationalists' contention. Rationalists would admit without question that we cannot predetermine which alternative fits the requirements of the given situation, and that therefore our only test of the act's fitness lies in its actual occurrence. They would declare, however, that our inability was due solely to our ignorance, and that this ignorance furnished no ground for a

[53] *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 139 f.; cf. also, *Meaning of Truth*, pp. 250 ff.

[54] For this discussion, cf. *The Will to Believe*, pp. 152 ff.

denial of the necessary relation of the act to the past or to the whole, as the case might be. Such a denial, they would maintain, implies a lack of connection, a discontinuity, such as to defy thought.

That contingency implies discontinuity is never questioned by James, but he nevertheless has no hesitation in accepting it as a genuine fact. To those who declare discontinuity to be unthinkable, he replies in two ways: first, discontinuity does not involve the absence of all continuity; second, even if discontinuity were inconceivable, this would not prove it unreal. Both these replies proceed clearly from James' opposition to abstractionism or "false intellectualism."

The absolute opposition of continuity to discontinuity is due, James declares, to abstractionism. The *concepts*, it is true, are opposed, but this does not mean that *objects* may not, in different respects, be both continuous and discontinuous, just as a man may be both tall and short with reference to different objects. As a matter of fact, experience shows this to be the case. We find neither absolute continuity nor absolute discontinuity between sensations, but relations of various sorts and various degrees. These relations, in James' opinion, are given within experience itself, and are no more mysterious than are any other of its facts. The relations actually experienced include relations of mere "withness" and "nearness," as well as those of logical connection, and hence do not involve the rigid continuity of the universe. Experience, therefore, gives no warrant for an assertion either of absolute continuity or of absolute discontinuity, but discloses various sorts of continuity and discontinuity between particular groups of phenomena.[55]

In the second place, the alleged inconceivability of discontinuity, James insists, would not necessarily exclude its reality. This rather bald statement indicates James'

[55] Cf. *Radical Empiricism*, pp. 95, 107.

general attitude toward conception.[56] In his opinion, concepts are indeed useful and, in so far, valid instruments for the extension and understanding of experience. By their very nature, however, they are abstract and static, and so can never be regarded as a substitute for the richness of immediacy. The final test of their validity lies always in the realm of perception. If they contradict perception, or make it less comprehensible, they must be rejected or refashioned. Experience overflows any conceptual account of it; "life is more than logic," and cannot be confined or subordinated to a system of concepts. The inconceivability of experienced discontinuity, therefore, is evidence, not of its unreality, but of the limitations of conception. To many such a contention seems the surrender of reason, and of any claim to a philosophy. Through it, however, James is at once freed not only from the difficulties of discontinuity but also from those connected with the problem of freedom and with other parts of his philosophical system. Indeed, James confesses that he puzzled over certain problems for years, and despaired of their solution, until finally, through the influence of Bergson, he had the courage once and for all to throw aside the old logic as incapable of stating the real nature of experience.[57]

Critics of James' view continually assert that the admission of discontinuity brings with it a moral as well as a logical chaos. "If discontinuity is real," they claim, "there is no place for education and the development of character. A saint may commit murder, a man's closest friend may suddenly become his enemy, and no reliance can be placed upon the knowledge of character." James explicitly denies that such an absurd conclusion follows from his view.[58] The criticism is due, he declares, to

[56] Cf. *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Chaps. IV–VI; cf. also *The Meaning of Truth*, Chap. XIII.

[57] Cf. *A Pluralistic Universe*, Lect. V, espec. pp. 212–214.

[58] Cf. *The Will to Believe*, p. 157, note.

the old error of abstractionism. Discontinuity is supposed by the critic to mean *absolute* discontinuity; because some alternatives are open, *all* are supposed to be so. The criticism, moreover, fails to take account of the distinction between physical and moral possibilities. An act may be physically possible but morally impossible, e. g., it is physically possible, but morally impossible for a normal mother to murder her child. In any given situation the number of moral possibilities is less than the number of physical possibilities, the former depending upon the habits and purposes of the self. Yet the nature of the self is not usually so fixed and determined that only one action is possible. In any case of genuine choice, several acts are so in keeping with the nature of the self, that they all make some appeal and are therefore genuinely possible. Whichever act ensues is continuous with the nature and past experience of the self, though not necessitated by them. Hence discontinuity does not mean a break with the past. The past influences, although it cannot absolutely determine, the present and the future.

Closely connected with the question of discontinuity is that of novelty. For James, novelty is a real aspect of experience which no difficulties of a conceptual sort should lead us to deny. That novelty exists in the external world might, James admits, be questioned; the new might in this case consist in a mere rearrangement of pre-existing parts. In the realm of human consciousness, however, the reality of novelty is, he maintains, incontrovertible. New sensations, new feelings, new concepts constantly arise. Since such immediate experiences can exist only as they are perceived, the actual felt novelty cannot be denied or be reduced to anything that is not immediately experienced.[59] The existence of such novelty, indeed, raises no problem for a view that accepts discontinuity in its description of the origin of being. According to such a theory, "time, change, etc., would grow by

[59] Cf. *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 149 ff.

finite buds or drops, either nothing coming at all, or certain units of amount bursting into being 'at a stroke.'" [60] These "buds or drops" might indeed constitute absolute novelties, i. e., they might actually bring into the universe something that was in no wise there before. The reader will probably at once object that it is impossible to think of a particular fact thus arising out of nothing, and dropping upon us out of "the blue." This objection, however, is based on the old scholastic idea of causation and of continuity. James insists that the origin of being is *always* inconceivable, and that the monist is here as badly off as the pluralist. He says, "if you are a rationalist you beg a kilogram of being at once, we will say; if you are an empiricist you beg a thousand successive grams; but you beg the same amount in each case, and you are the same beggar whatever you may pretend. You leave the logical riddle untouched, of how the coming of whatever is, came it all at once, or came it piecemeal, can be intellectually understood." [61] Of course, the rationalist will insist that the coming into being of the universe as a whole is a false problem, since the categories of existence and time apply only to parts of the universe, not to the whole. To James this explanation is not satisfactory. He denies the right of the monist to assume the eternal nature of the whole, and declares that this assumption throws no light on the problem of the existence of temporal experience. However, regardless of the merits of this question, James need not trouble himself about the conceivability of novelty and creation, since he has already proclaimed his release from the bonds of conception.

Novelty is frequently held to be incompatible with causation, but here again, according to our author, the difficulty has its origin in an overvaluation of conception. In the conceptual realm, causation does exclude novelty. Yet causation when treated conceptually is itself full of diffi-

[60] *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 154.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

culties and contradictions, and becomes clear only when actually experienced. This actual experience of causation comes, James tells us, in our own activity situations. These activity situations he describes as follows: "In all of these what we feel is that a previous field of 'consciousness,' containing the idea of a result, develops gradually into another field in which that result either appears as accomplished, or else is prevented by obstacles against which we still feel ourselves to press. . . . The experiencer of such a situation feels the push, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up, just as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness of intensity, the movement, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or whatever remaining characters the situation may involve. He goes through all that can ever be imagined where activity is supposed. The word 'activity' has no content save these experiences of process, obstruction, striving, strain, or release, ultimate *qualia* as they are of the life given us to be known. No matter what 'efficacies' there may really be in this extraordinary universe it is impossible to conceive of any one of them being either lived through or authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcome." [62] Activity as thus experienced is not in the least incompatible with novelty, for the result achieved contains new aspects not prefigured in the idea of the end to be attained. Hence the problem of the compatibility of causation and novelty vanishes when both are treated perceptually.

James' recognition of the reality of contingency, discontinuity, novelty and activity, is in accord with his pluralistic view of the universe. He believes that reality exists distributively rather than collectively, and that it must therefore be described as "eaches" and "everys"

[62] *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 210–212.

rather than as a whole. [63] He recognizes, to be sure, many sorts of unity in the universe, e. g., unity of discourse, unity of time and space, unity of purpose, but maintains that there is no valid reason for asserting that the universe has the thoroughgoing and systematic unity of a logical system.[64] Now this pluralistic view of the universe has, in James' opinion, several advantages over monism. It is more scientific and empirical since it attempts to describe the concrete unities found in experience, rather than to reduce all to a mystic and abstract unity indescribable and unverifiable from the human point of view. It does justice to the temporal standpoint. Furthermore, it makes life interesting and dramatic by leaving room for freedom and activity. As this relation between pluralism and freedom is the point of especial interest for our purposes, I may be pardoned for quoting James' explicit statements. "The commonsense view of life as something really dramatic, with work done and things decided here and now is acceptable to pluralism. Free will means nothing but real novelty, so pluralism accepts the notion of free will." [65] Although James himself is an ardent pluralist and libertarian, he does not, we must remember, regard pluralism as logically demonstrated. He insists only that an adoption of radical empiricism as the fundamental method of philosophy precludes the acceptance of a monism that relegates many of the clearest facts of experience to the realm of appearance.

Thus far our discussion has centered about the logical implications of James' conception of freedom. We must now turn to an examination of the principal reasons offered by him in support of his belief in its reality.

[63] Cf. *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 322 ff.

[64] Cf. *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Chaps. VII and VIII; also cf. *Pragmatism*, Lect. IV.

[65] *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 140, cf. pp. 142 ff.

III

James' conviction of the reality of freedom rests primarily on moral grounds. In his essay entitled "The Dilemma of Determinism," he seeks to show that indeterminism alone can do justice to moral striving, inasmuch as any form of determinism leads inevitably to a denial of evil and of regret. Since this is his most important argument, it is worth our while to follow it in some detail.

In the face of a moral catastrophe, the determinist, James maintains, may take either of two views.[66] He may assert that the universe is good, and that therefore this act, in spite of all appearances, must be ultimately good; he may unflinchingly regard the act as absolutely evil, and conclude that a universe that necessitates such an act, must be evil. If he take the latter course, a taint of evil anywhere is a symptom of the corruption of the whole, and he is left in the darkness and despair of pessimism. On the other hand, if he take the former course, he is often compelled to stifle his moral sense, and to ignore the promptings of his whole moral nature. Furthermore even if he succeeds in so doing, a logical difficulty awaits him. If the act is good, as he declares, then any feeling of regret for the act is an error. Yet the regret is part of a rational universe, and as such cannot be irrational. The question then is, "how can a rational universe that includes only good acts, have a place for regret?" Or, to put it otherwise, "how can an act be good and regret for it justifiable at one and the same time?"

The determinist boldly grasps the horns of the dilemma, and declares that it is true both that the evil act is a necessary element in the good, and that regret for the act is justifiable, since regret is one of the very means through which evil is transformed into good. Through sin and penitence, the individual is awakened to new ideals, and aroused to greater effort. By this means, both his knowledge and

[66] Cf. *The Will to Believe*, pp. 159 ff.

sympathy are increased. Thus the evil act becomes the source of greater power and is made an element in the good. Since the end of life is not merely external occurrences, but rather the enrichment of personality, this effect of evil on the character of the individual may justify its existence. Indeed experience continually teaches us that evil is the price of the good, and that a universe without evil would be insipid. Thus James describes the determinists' reply to his dilemma.

Although the determinist by this reply escapes pessimism, he falls into subjectivism. This subjectivism may be infinitely preferable to pessimism, and may be theoretically acceptable; yet, James maintains, it has consequences that are disastrous to the moral life. It makes man a spectator of life, rather than an earnest participant. It declares that all life is for the sake of consciousness, so that man is free to sin as he please so long as he repents. It saps the vitality from the moral life, and perverts the plain dictates of man's moral consciousness, by turning his attention continually inward. James vividly and picturesquely describes its results thus: "The attitude of gnostical romanticism wrenches my personal instincts. . . . It falsifies the simple objectivity of their deliverance. It makes the goose-flesh the murder excites in me a sufficient reason for the perpetration of the crime. It transforms life from a tragic reality into an insincere melodramatic exhibition as foul or as tawdry as any one's diseased curiosity pleases to carry it out." [67]

Determinists, however, would not assent to James' statement of their view and would utterly disown the consequences he derives from it. They do not say that life is for the sake of any finite consciousness, or that sin and regret are justified merely by their effect on the individual. Both sin and regret have their place in the whole, and cannot be understood apart from that whole. Both act and regret may seem evil—in fact the regret may

[67] *The Will to Believe*, p. 178.

sometimes appear more disastrous than the act itself—yet both are necessary for the whole, and therefore both are good. Since the act is justified by its relation to the whole, and not exclusively by its relation to the individual, their view does not turn the attention inward, and is not necessarily subjectivistic. Furthermore evil is for them not merely illusory, but rather a tragic fact that can be overcome only by struggle and suffering. The genuine and tragic nature of this struggle precludes absolutely the trifling attitude indicated by the statement, "sin for the sake of repenting." Moreover, this very struggle and transcendence of evil are necessary elements in the perfection of the whole and so are not dependent upon the subjective caprice of any finite individual. Finally their position does not, as James affirms, make man a mere spectator. Man's acts are indeed necessary, but they are necessarily performed by him and not apart from him. Man's decision is actually part of the universe, and the universe could not be the same without this decision. In spite of all this, however, the question remains as to how a perfection that is already complete can work itself out through man's moral and temporal strivings. Evil, although not merely illusory, is, nevertheless, according to the determinists' view, a necessary element in the perfection of the whole, and *as such* ultimately good. Hence no determinist who is logical in his position can ever say of any element in the universe "this ought not to be," or of any of his own past deeds, " I ought not to have done it." Regret, then, in this sense, must be banished from the consciousness of a determinist, but with it goes much that is characteristic of the moral life. Determinists sometimes attempt to avoid such difficulties by pronouncing the moral consciousness itself fragmentary and illusory, but such a course simply furnishes additional evidence in support of James' contention that determinism cannot do justice to the moral life.

The determinist, James has tried to show, must ulti-

mately accept either subjectivism or pessimism. The indeterminist, on the other hand, need adopt neither, and thus, in James' opinion, he escapes many moral difficulties. He can regard an act as absolutely evil, and yet keep free from pessimism, for some of the universe may be evil, while the rest remains untainted. There is always a possibility of evil; if there were not, life would be without zest and moral struggle impossible. The actual commission of evil, however, depends upon the will of the individual. If he chooses the evil, he brings into the universe something that need not and should not be there. The evil which he commits may, to be sure, become an element in the good. Such a transformation, however, does not, according to James' view, *necessarily* occur, but is contingent upon the will and courage of the individual. The universe is neither lost nor saved as a whole. Its fate lies in the hand of humanity, and other semi-independent forces. There can be no certainty about the future of society, no guarantee of the preservation of our most cherished ideals and values, for all depends upon the co-operation of individuals who may fail. Thus freedom brings a risk which may well make us pause. If the universe seemed absolutely good to us, we might indeed well decline to take this risk; but since many of its aspects seem evil, the risk is worth taking. The chance which freedom brings is a chance for hope as well as for fear. It is a chance that, in spite of the existence of evils, individuals may, if they will, so change their own nature and the conditions of life, that society may be transformed and evil conquered. This view of the universe can appeal only to those who are willing to take a risk, to venture on faith, trusting to human nature and to the goodness of higher powers, if there be such. It cannot satisfy those who demand absolute assurance that the causes for which they work will triumph in so far as they are good, and that all is eternally well with the universe. To these, James offers some solace by his suggestion of the possible existence of a Providence that can

counteract the effects of man's blunders, and safeguard the fate of the universe.[68] This suggestion, however, is so contrary to James' teaching concerning the momentous nature of human choice that we need not consider it here.

The controversy between determinists and indeterminists often centers about the question of the ground for praise and blame. James, however, seeks to keep clear of this problem by insisting that the justification of praise and blame is without great significance for the moral life, and has little effect upon the problem of freedom. In his words, "To make our human ethics revolve about the question of 'merit' is a piteous unreality—God alone can know our merits, if we have any. The real ground for supposing free will is indeed pragmatic, but it has nothing to do with this contemptible right to punish which has made such a noise in past discussions of the subject." [69] Although much may be said for this position, it is pertinent to remark that after all the question of praise and blame is not far removed from the question of the validity of the feeling of regret which plays so large a part in James' own argument in *The Dilemma of Determinism*. Furthermore, the question of praise and blame, connected as it is with the problem of responsibility, is of vital importance both from the point of view of individual morality and from that of the social order. Contingency, in the extreme form of the free will of indifference, does, it is true, so separate the act from the agent as to destroy responsibility. Nevertheless, the acceptance of an element of contingency seems to be a necessary condition of the validity of the feeling of responsibility, since the feeling of responsibility for a past evil act carries with it the consciousness that we could have and should have acted otherwise.

The persuasiveness of the argument for freedom on the ground of moral demands is enhanced for James by his conception of truth. He maintains that when objective evidence is lacking, as in the case of freedom, we have a

[68] Cf. *The Will to Believe*, pp. 180 ff. [69] *Pragmatism*, p. 118.

right to accept as true that theory which does most justice to both the intellectual and moral demands.[70] Few people would deny that we have a right to believe, if we choose, any theory that does not contradict the facts. Many, however, would refuse to go with the pragmatist in assuming that the satisfactory character of such a belief is evidence of its *truth*. Unless one does make this assumption, however, one cannot pass from the statement of the moral advantages of freedom to an assertion of its reality, until one establishes the fact that the constitution of the universe is such that reality necessarily satisfies man's needs. Hence unless we accept the pragmatic conception of truth, James' argument is not conclusive. However, the question of the validity of the argument for freedom does not seriously affect James' own position, for he is content to show that we have a right to believe in freedom, if we will, without arguing that this belief is necessarily true. Here, as in the realm of action, we must run a risk. Our belief may be true—James firmly believes that it is true—but it may conceivably be false.

IV

We may now briefly summarize the result of our discussion and form some estimate of the significance of James' teaching concerning freedom.

The principal value of James' discussion of freedom for the purposes of our study lies in its thoroughgoing nature —in its unhesitating acceptance of all the logical implications of freedom. Thus, James shows that freedom a contingency involves activity, novelty, and real discontinuity. He regards these categories as real aspects of the universe, even though, by so doing, he is obliged to subordinate conceptual thinking to immediate experience. He believes that freedom in its most radical sense is real, but that a recognition of its reality necessitates the abandonment of the old logic and the return to immediacy. Fur-

[70] Cf. *The Will to Believe*, pp. 11 ff., 145–146.

thermore, James brings out clearly the necessary connection between the acceptance of freedom as contingency and a pluralistic view of the universe.

The greatest defect of James' doctrine arises from his complete identification of freedom with contingency. Although contingency is, we believe, a necessary element in freedom, it by no means follows that it is its complete equivalent. It is clear that the mere presence of contingency in the universe at large affords no guarantee for the reality of specifically human freedom. As Perry expresses it, "Indeterminism in this general pluralistic sense contributes nothing toward proving human freedom. Such indeterminism attaches to man no more than to any other part of reality. It would be perfectly consistent with it that man should be less free than the planets. It proves that existence makes strange bed-fellows, and that the course of events is surprising. But it does not endow man, the moral agent, with any unique share in this disjunction and novelty; nor with any peculiar power to direct it or profit by it. There is an element of chance in life, but it is as likely to be the mishap of which man is the victim, as the opportunity of which he is the matter." [71] Ethical freedom, indeed, demands more than the mere presence of alternatives. The self-expression which it implies might, in one situation, be possible if only a single course of action were open, while, in another situation, it might be impossible although many alternatives were open. The question of the relation of ethical freedom to indeterminateness, is thus analogous to the old question of the relation of positive to negative freedom, and we must admit that merely negative freedom cannot insure the presence of positive freedom. Hence the reduction of the problem of freedom to the question of contingency undoubtedly robs it of many valuable aspects.

In conclusion, we must admit that a summary can never do justice to the richness and concreteness of James'

[71] *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 253.

teaching. Whether or not one agrees with his conclusions, one cannot fail to be stimulated by his writings. By refusing to take refuge in abstractions, he calls one back continually to the concrete world of experience. By emphasizing moral demands, he keeps one from a merely intellectualistic interpretation of the universe. By his robust courage, he challenges one to act bravely and faithfully as though free, even if one cannot by his intellect alone prove the reality of freedom.

CHAPTER IV

BERGSON'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

I

When we turn from the consideration of James' conception of freedom to that of Bergson, we are impressed at once by significant points of similarity between the two doctrines. For Bergson as for James, freedom implies the reality of time, of creation, and of novelty. For him also, freedom is directly revealed in our experience of activity, and the assertion of its reality brings with it a criticism of the rôle of conception and a reliance upon immediacy. Nevertheless, in spite of such likenesses, there are also genuine differences in the two teachings. The anti-intellectualistic tendency leads, in Bergson's case, not to ordinary empiricism, but to an insistence upon intuition as distinct from ordinary perception. Thus, Bergson maintains that freedom is revealed in intuition alone, and is falsified by perception as well as by conception. Again, concrete duration as described by Bergson has certain characteristics not ascribed to time by James. Finally, Bergson's intuitive apprehension of continuity throughout the universe leads him to a denial of ultimate individuality and thus to a view quite opposed to James' radically pluralistic teaching. These points of agreement and of disagreement, however, will become clearer as we proceed with our study of Bergson's discussion of freedom.

In a Report of the French Philosophical Society, Bergson has described his conception of freedom as follows: "The word *liberty* has for me a sense intermediate between those which we assign as a rule to the two terms liberty and freedom. On the one hand, I believe that liberty

consists in being entirely oneself, in acting in conformity with oneself; it is then, to a certain degree, the 'moral liberty' of philosophers, the independence of the person with regard to everything other than itself. But that is not quite this liberty, since the independence I am describing has not always a moral character. Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as an effect depends on the cause which of *necessity* determines it. In this, I should come back to the sense of 'free-will.' And yet I do not accept this sense completely either, since free-will in the usual meaning of the term, implies the equal possibility of two contraries, and on my theory we cannot formulate, or even conceive in this case the thesis of the equal possibility of the two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of time. I might say, then, that the object of my thesis, on this particular point, has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moral liberty' and 'free-will.' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated between these two terms, but not at equal distances from both. If I were obliged to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'free-will.'[72] Bergson declares, in this passage, that "liberty is situated midway between the two terms," yet he seems to oscillate between the two ideas rather to harmonize them, and his compromise is beset with many difficulties. This criticism must of course be supported by a careful examination of the meaning which he attaches to these conceptions, and of their implications in his philosophy. Before turning to this examination, however, we must note that Bergson also identifies freedom with spontaneity or creation. This latter usage is, indeed, more characteristic of his teaching than either of the above, and therefore claims our first consideration. Since freedom in all three senses is, by our author, regarded as revealed directly in our intuition of our own life we shall first examine these conceptions with ref-

[72] *Report of the French Philosophical Society.* Quoted from LeRoy, *The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson*, p. 192.

erence to human experience, and then direct our attention to the relation of human freedom to the vital impetus.

II

Bergson declares again and again that duration involves ceaseless creation, spontaneity, and novelty. As he expresses it, "The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new." [73] Or again, "as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it means creation." [74] This identification of creation with duration depends upon Bergson's belief that memory is involved in real duration. The presence of memory insures a continuance of the past in the present. For this reason alone each moment is qualitatively different from every preceding moment.[75] Hence wherever there is memory, as is the case with duration, there is creation in the sense of genuine novelty. As Bergson says, "For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly." [76] If, however, one is unwilling to assent to Bergson's view that duration in itself involves memory, one cannot accept his statement that the reality of time by itself furnishes any ground for the certainty of creation. [77] It will therefore be less misleading to keep the terms "creation" and "duration" distinct, without losing sight of the fact that creation and novelty demand the reality of time, although they are not reducible to it.

The acceptance of the reality of creation enables one, Bergson believes, both to understand the source of the

[73] *Creative Evolution*, p. 11.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 343.

[75] Cf. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 12 ff.

[76] *Creative Evolution*, p. 7.

[77] For a clear statement of this point, cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism*, The University of California Chronicle, Vol. XV, no. 4, pp. 441 ff. Cf. also Stewart, *Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*, pp. 216 ff.

difficulties in the usual statements of the problem of freedom, and to escape from all forms of determinism. Thus, he applies his view of creation to the position of physical and of psychological determinism, and to the problems of causation, contingency, and prediction. His arguments here are so well known, that the briefest summary will suffice for our purpose.

In the first place, the recognition of the creative character of human nature shows that physical determinism, based as it is on the law of the conservation of energy, cannot be valid in the case of human experience.[78] That law has meaning only where changes are reversible, and such cannot be the case in the conscious life where each moment depends upon the past and yet adds something to it. In the second place, the intuition of creative duration discloses the fallacy of psychological determinism.[79] This doctrine is based either upon some form of psychophysical parallelism or upon an associationist view of mind. Now, according to Bergson, the former is incompatible with the actual facts of memory and is, moreover, inherently contradictory; the latter completely falsifies the continuity of the self as revealed in the intuition of its real duration and creation.

Furthermore the intuition of duration or, as we would rather say, the intuition of ceaseless creation in time, furnishes a means of attack upon that stronghold of determinism, the principle of causation. According to the principle of mechanistic causation, we may affirm that a given cause is always followed by a given effect. Now this principle, Bergson maintains, is merely a generalization based upon the observation of uniform sequences in nature. As such, it can lay claim to no necessity. Moreover, intuition shows that causation in the sense just discussed can have no meaning for the psychic realm. In this realm no uniform sequences can be discovered, since no moment can ever be repeated. The statement, then,

[78] Cf. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 143 ff. [79] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 155 ff.

that *if* the same cause recurs the same effect must follow, is absolutely devoid of significance when applied to the conscious life.[80] Nevertheless, Bergson teaches, causation possesses another meaning, such that it is genuinely applicable to the conscious realm. For, like James, he maintains that the real nature of causation is revealed to us in our experience of effort. In this experience, we find that the future springs from the present, and is prefigured in it, though not absolutely necessitated by it. This actual experience of effort exhibits creation at work, and in no sense precludes the reality of freedom. Thus, neither sort of causation, when clearly analyzed and understood, can furnish any reason for doubting the fact of freedom.[81]

The difficulties in regard to contingency also arise, according to Bergson, from a failure to grasp the real nature of time and of creation.[82] Both indeterminists and determinists make the mistake of picturing the decision of the self as an oscillation between several fixed alternatives. When the question is regarded in this way, the victory, Bergson says, must go to the determinists, since the fact that the self finally chooses one way is evidence that it could not choose in any other.[83] Yet the fact of indecision still remains as evidence of the truth of the indeterminists' claim. This indecision is explicable, Bergson believes, not in terms of pre-existing alternatives, but of the growing and changing self. What we call alternatives are really tendencies and directions within the self, continually changing and developing through the process of choice. As our author expresses it, "deliberation. . . . really consists in a dynamic progress in which the self and its motives, like real living beings, are in a constant state of becoming."[84]

[80] Cf. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 199 ff.
[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.
[82] *Ibid.*, pp. 173 ff.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 180; cf. above, p. 31.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

The intuition of creation is utilized by Bergson to show the impossibility of prediction in human affairs. [85] In the material world, prediction is possible, for time is not operative. In the human realm, on the contrary, time is real and brings with it creation; hence no knowledge of antecedents can make prediction possible. Furthermore, the complete knowledge of the antecedents themselves involves a knowledge of their place in the process that issues in the act, and since the time of this process cannot be altered without altering its character, the antecedents cannot be known completely until the act occurs. Hence there can be no possibility of *fore*-knowledge. Now this rather radical doctrine of Bergson's is undoubtedly open to many objections. If it is true that one cannot know an act without living through the actual time consumed by the act itself, then knowledge of the past would seem to be as impossible as knowledge of the future, for the memory which reviews the act never occupies the same time as the original act. Bergson, it is true, might meet this objection by declaring that the past, in so far as it has been lived through, has become a "thing" which is capable of being known and represented without being lived through a second time. Yet the fact that memory, in this case, contracts the original duration without altering its character, certainly contradicts Bergson's assertion that duration cannot be changed without a change in the character of the process. Furthermore, it is by no means clear how, on Bergson's theory, duration, even when past, can become a spatialized "thing." Bosanquet has objected to Bergson's denial of prediction on the ground that, although the action of a self cannot be reduced to a mere result of antecedents and predicted in the fashion of an eclipse, yet foreknowledge of the self's action is by no means impossible. [86] Such foreknowledge depends upon the identifica-

[85] Cf. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 183 ff.

[86] Cf. Bosanquet, *Prediction of Human Conduct*, Int. Jnl. of Ethics, Vol. 21, pp. 14–15.

tion of oneself with the life of another self in such a way as to understand his desires and purposes. Foreknowledge, moreover, becomes easier the more that life is organized and unified by a controlling purpose. Obviously, there is much to be said for this contention, and Bergson himself would admit that, in such a case, a probable prediction is indeed possible. His quarrel with the assertion, however, would arise from his insistance that, since time is real, the purpose of the self is never given complete at any moment of time. This purpose itself grows and expands with the creation of the self and cannot, therefore, be the basis of an absolute prediction of the action of even the most rational self.

Before turning to Bergson's other usages of the term "freedom," it may be convenient to summarize, in a sentence or two, the result of the foregoing discussion. Bergson teaches that duration itself is creative, and that freedom, in the sense of real creation or spontaneity, is characteristic of all life that endures. This position, he believes, affords an escape from most objections that are raised against the reality of freedom. While such an identification of time and creation is, as we have seen, unjustifiable, nevertheless it remains true that the recognition of the reality of time clears the way for the assertion of freedom and discloses the untenability of many of the determinists' contentions.

The second meaning which, as we have noted, Bergson attaches to freedom is that of indeterminateness or contingency. At first sight there appears to be little difference between this conception and the one which we have just discussed. In fact, our examination of James' philosophy has shown that both indeterminateness and spontaneity are essential elements of freedom. Yet, Bergson's descriptions of freedom in these two senses disclose not only a clear distinction in meaning, but also, in some cases, a radical inconsistency between the two, which makes it confusing to identify freedom with both. In discussing

freedom as creation, Bergson distinctly disavows the possibility of conceiving freedom as choice between alternatives. Freedom as indeterminateness, however, is described as dependent upon the existence of alternatives. On the one hand, Bergson declares that alternatives are *never* given beforehand, and that the nature of time precludes the possibility of foreseeing different possible courses of action; on the other hand, he says that freedom involves anticipatory images, and that "possibilities of action must . . . be marked out for the living being before the action itself." [87] It must be remarked, however, that the contradiction is perhaps not so glaring as this comparison of passages might suggest. Bergson would undoubtedly admit the possibility of foreseeing different paths of action, while maintaining that these alternate paths were not fixed and definite but grew and changed throughout the process of the decision of the self. There remains, however, a more deep-seated inconsistency. Freedom as creation or as real duration is fundamentally of the nature of the unconscious, or, better, of the supraconscious, [88] while freedom as indeterminateness depends upon consciousness and is measured by it. [89] Thus, Bergson says of memory (which is for him equivalent to free creative spirit) that "from the moment that it becomes image, the past leaves the state of pure memory and coincides with a certain part of my present. Memory actualized in an image differs, then, profoundly from pure memory." [90] The whole past life of the self exists as pure memory in a state of unconsciousness, and becomes conscious only because of the demands of action. Now it is just in this zone of action that freedom as indeterminateness plays its rôle, and here consciousness is indispensable.

[87] *Creative Evolution*, p. 96.

[88] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 46, 176 f.

[89] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 111, 144, 179, 262 ff.; *Matter and Memory*, pp. 182, 233, 304.

[90] *Matter and Memory*, p. 181.

In Bergson's words, "the chief office of consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice." [91] "Either sensation has nothing to do, or it is nascent freedom." [92] "Consciousness corresponds exactly to the living being's power of choice; it is co-extensive with the fringe of possible action that surrounds the real action; consciousness is synonymous with invention and with freedom." [93] A further difference between freedom as indeterminateness and freedom as creation lies in the fact that the former admits of degrees and in its highest degree is the prerogative of man alone, while the latter is characteristic of all life. Man's indeterminateness is secured, according to Bergson, by means of his complex nervous structure, by the possession of language and the demands of society.[94] In this respect, then, language and social life are regarded by Bergson as conducive to freedom, although, according to many other of his expressions, they tend to work against freedom and to reduce man to an automaton.[95]

The third and most restricted meaning which Bergson gives to freedom is that of complete self-expression. In describing this sort of freedom, Bergson declares, in contradiction to his later assertion that freedom involves choice and the anticipatory ideas of various actions, that "freedom must be sought in a certain shade or quality of the action itself and not in the relation of this act to what it is not or to what it might have been." [96] The free act "agrees with the whole of our most intimate feelings, thoughts, and aspirations, with that particular conception of life which is the equivalent of all our past experience, in a word, with our personal idea of happiness and of honor." [97]

[91] *Matter and Memory*, p. 182.
[92] *Time and Free Will*, p. 34.
[93] *Creative Evolution*, pp. 263 f.
[94] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 264 f.
[95] Cf. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 129 ff. passim.
[96] *Ibid*, pp. 182 f.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

Such acts, Bergson maintains are exceptional." [98] They occur only in times of crisis, when the true self bursts through the fetters of habit and of merely external ideas and expresses its real nature. It is at this point that Bergson makes use of his distinction between the fundamental and the purely psychological self. [99] The former is pure duration, while the latter is the result of the materialization or automatization of the self through the influence of social life and the demands of action. This psychological self is the external projection of the real self—its spatial and social representation. Unlike the fundamental self, it is describable in terms of the laws of association, and is not free.

Now the question arises as to whether this doctrine of the two selves, and of the rarity of genuinely free acts, is in keeping with Bergson's teaching concerning duration and creation. If duration is by its very nature creative, if memory goes on ceaselessly, how can it ever happen that we fail to be free, or that we "become spatialized"? Bergson says explicitly, "*Every* psychological state reflects the whole personality." [100] "The whole of our past psychical life conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant; whole, also, it reveals itself in our character, although no one of its past states manifests itself explicitly in character." [101] "Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will, and act." [102] "In action, the entire person is engaged." [103] But, if these statements are accepted, it is clear that the free act cannot be exceptional, since all acts are a reflexion of the whole self. The distinction, then,

[98] *Time and Free Will*, pp. 167, 240.
[99] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 163 ff., 129 ff.
[100] *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 25 (Italics mine).
[101] *Matter and Memory*, p. 191.
[102] *Creative Evolution*, p. 5.
[103] *Laughter*, p. 143.

would lie not between free acts and those which are not free, but between acts which we consciously regard as free and those of whose freedom we remain unconscious. A hint in this direction may be found in the distinction which Bergson makes between the time in which we act and the time in which we see ourselves acting. He says, "The duration *wherein we see ourselves acting*, and in which it is useful that we should see ourselves, is a duration whose elements are dissociated and juxtaposed. The duration *wherein we act* is a duration wherein our states melt into each other. It is within this that we should try to replace ourselves by thought, in the exceptional and unique case when we speculate on the intimate nature of action, that is to say, when we are discussing human freedom." [104] From the point of view of this teaching, then, we may say that we *always* act with our fundamental self, so that *all* our acts are free as expressions of our whole personality, but that we sometimes fail to apprehend this freedom and therefore describe our activity in the inadequate terms predicable of the psychological self.

A further inconsistency between Bergson's description of freedom as complete self-expression and his teaching concerning freedom as creation, arises from the fact that *sometimes* Bergson implies that the former depends upon the activity of judgment or reflection. Thus, he tells us that external ideas and feelings are "the result of an education not properly assimilated, an education which appeals to the memory rather than to the judgment." [105] He specifically declines to regard free activity as reducible to *mere* spontaneity, saying that "in man the thinking being, the free act may be termed a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the evolution which leads to it a reasonable evolution." [106] Now, in so far as Bergson makes room for the activity of reason, and places judgment above memory

[104] *Matter and Memory*, pp. 243 f.
[105] *Time and Free Will*, p. 166.
[106] *Matter and Memory*, p. 243.

and above the processes of spontaneity, he is going in the direction of orthodox idealism. Furthermore, if the evolution of the free act is, as Bergson says, a rational evolution, rationality must be found within the unconscious depths of the soul, since the fundamental self has, according to Bergson's view, far deeper roots than appear in consciousness. Yet this positing of rationality below the conscious life is certainly quite antithetical to Bergson's anti-intellectualistic tendencies. We must, therefore, conclude that while Bergson's teaching sometimes suggests a kinship to the familiar idealistic doctrine of freedom as rational self-determination, its general trend lies in quite a different direction. The whole self of which he speaks is not the self as a rational, purposive being, but the entire history of the self, carried on by memory, and growing as it progresses. This self is, he declares, revealed in intuition. Yet intuition, as a matter of fact, seldom discloses anything which could even by courtesy be called a whole. It discloses rather a complex of conflicting tendencies and purposes, a jumble and a chaos which can hardly be said to express itself complete in any single act. Indeed, the fundamental difficulty with this aspect of Bergson's teaching lies just here, in his failure to give any clear conception or explanation of individuality. When we study his words closely, we find, moreover, that the self's individuality tends to be completely lost in the life of the vital impetus. Says he: "The living being is above all a thoroughfare, . . . the essence of life is in the movement by which life is transmitted." [107] "Thus souls are continually being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense preexisted. They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity." [108] But if this be the case, the significance of human individuality and of human freedom seems to vanish, and we are left with the problem of the

[107] *Creative Evolution*, p. 128.
[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 269 f.

nature of the vital impetus and of its relation to human selves.

In the foregoing analysis of Bergson's various conceptions of freedom, we have attempted to bring out the distinctions between them as sharply as possible. In so doing we have perhaps neglected certain relationships. A justification for this procedure lies in the fact that these relationships come out most clearly when the conceptions are regarded, not in themselves or as characteristic of man's experience, but rather as stages in the creative evolution of the vital impetus. To this consideration, then, we turn.

III

The vital impetus is, for Bergson, ceaseless creation and growth, and the story of evolution is but the record of creative activity. [109] In its creative activity, however, the vital impetus is constantly beset with obstacles. From its struggle with these obstacles results its dissociation into the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and into different species and different individuals. Furthermore, in endeavoring to conquer matter, life is forced to adapt itself to matter, and, by so doing, imperils its own freedom. Hence, on many lines of evolution, freedom seems to be completely lost and life to be conquered by matter. In man, however, life prevails, and succeeds in making matter the vehicle of freedom.[110] Yet even here the victory is not complete. Man constantly tends to become an automaton, and only certain of his acts are free. Thus, freedom as creation or spontaneity is characteristic of the vital impetus as such. Freedom as indeterminateness is the means and the measure of the success of the vital impetus in its effort to express freedom. But even indeterminateness does not insure full expression of the creative life. An adequate embodiment of such creative

[109] Cf. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 251 ff.
[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 264–267.

activity is found only in those rare acts which are the outcome of the whole enduring and growing process of the fundamental self. Such, very roughly, is the way in which we may relate Bergson's different conceptions of freedom. By no means, however, does this account resolve all the difficulties which we have raised in regard to their compatibility. Moreover, it has difficulties of its own which we must now face.

One of the most deep-seated of these difficulties lies in the problem of the relation of the vital impetus to necessity. Necessity is due to the presence of matter or of space, but Bergson's conception of matter is by no means clear. Sometimes he makes matter equivalent to space, and apparently regards it as a second principle of reality coordinate with life.[111] On the other hand, he sometimes regards it as merely a different direction in the stream of the vital impetus—a descending current due to life itself.[112] But if this be the meaning of matter, it is hard to see what could have caused the original arrest in creative activity, for before the creation of matter there could have been no obstacle to freedom. There seems to be no reason why life itself should have posited its own ineradicable foe. Again, Bergson teaches that matter differs from life only in the rate of its duration, and that the quantitative and homogeneous spatial nature which we attribute to matter is but a construct of the human intellect.[113] Here again there would seem to be no cause for conflict. If life constructs the idea of space for its own purposes, surely this construct can be dropped whenever it conflicts with life. Yet, unless matter remains as a genuine opposing principle

[111] He holds to this view pretty consistently throughout *Time and Free Will*. His teaching here issues in a distinct dualism between consciousness, which is purely qualitative and enduring, and matter, which is spatial and quantitative. For a clear statement of the parallelism between this view and Fichte's problem, see E. L. Schaub, *Hegel's Criticism of Fichte's Subjectivism*, Phil. Rev., 1913, p. 30.

[112] Cf. *Creative Evolution*, Chap. III.

[113] Cf. *Matter and Memory*, pp. 244 ff., 278 ff.

to life, creation ceases, for dissociation, through which creation proceeds, depends upon the existence of obstacles. Moreover, the nature of the vital impetus itself is not wholly clear. Bergson declares that it somewhat resembles voluntary activity, and his descriptions of it abound in terms taken from the realm of volition. Thus, he speaks of its "striving," "effort," "success," "failure," etc. However, his distrust of teleology prevents him from carrying out this analogy in a thoroughgoing manner, and many of his expressions concerning the vital impetus indicate that its activity is more akin to merely sentient and irrational spontaneity than to rational purposive volition.[114] If this is the case, the following criticism of Balfour's is indeed in place: "Creation, freedom, will, these doubtless are great things, but we cannot lastingly admire them, unless we know their drift. In his philosophy, superconsciousness is so indeterminate that it is not permitted to hamper itself with purpose more definite than that of self-augmentation. It is ignorant not only of its course, but of its goal, and for the sufficient reason that in M. Bergson's philosophy these things are not only unknown but unknowable." [115] Bergson, however, need not go to the length of this conclusion. He must deny that the vital impetus has a complete knowledge of the future, since on his principles such foreknowledge is incompatible with the reality of time, but he need not deny that the vital impetus is genuinely purposive, and is guided by ideas of the future which grow and develop as creation proceeds. If Bergson does not accept some such measure of teleology, his principle of vital activity becomes practically equivalent to a blind and irrational force hardly describable as analogous to will.

In raising the question of the nature of *the* vital impetus, we have taken for granted its unity and individuality.

[114] For his denial of teleology, see *Creative Evolution*, pp. 39 ff.

[115] *Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt*, Hibbert Journal, Vol. X, p. 23.

Yet the vital impetus as described by Bergson is not individual in the sense of a harmonious whole or an organized self. It is merely a vague continuity of life which dissociates itself into separate centers through conflict with an opposing force. Its harmony is in its origin rather than in its goal and its tendencies become more and more diverse and conflicting as it proceeds.[116] Yet life that is thus dissociated apparently issues in a plurality rather than a unity, and forfeits its claim to be individual in any significant sense. An acceptance of this plurality of individual centers of life would seem to lead logically to such a form of pluralism as would leave place for the genuine freedom of separate living beings but would preclude the unity and individuality of the vital impetus. Bergson, however, is kept from such a conclusion by his insistence upon the "continuity of the real." He is thus led to a kind of monism in which finite freedom and individuality are submerged in the flux of the cosmic life.[117] Doubtless he would tell us that our difficulties here arise from our looking at the problem abstractly. He would assure us that if only we would immerse ourselves by intuition in the concrete duration of the vital impetus, we would see that that duration is genuinely one and also genuinely many. But the value of this reply depends upon the value which is placed upon intuition. It therefore necessitates a very brief glance at the rôle of intuition in Bergson's philosophy.

In Bergson's opinion, intuition offers the only satisfactory approach to reality.[118] By its means, apparently all problems may be solved, and reality experienced in its inmost nature. Hence, Bergson maintains, intuition must be the method of philosophy. Now it is, of course, undoubtedly true that intuition (at least in the sense of an immediate contact with reality) is indispensable for philosophy. Yet the reliance upon intuition alone is fraught with grave

[116] Cf. *Creative Evolution*, p. 51.

[117] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 128.

[118] *Introduction to Metaphysics; Creative Evolution*, pp. 238, 343.

dangers. Coupled as it is in Bergson's own case with a distrust of conception, it seems ultimately to involve an uncritical acceptance of any fact or any feeling reported by an observer who is confident that he has succeeded in immersing himself in reality. Bergson, of course, denies any such implication. He says that intuitions must be criticized and worked over if they are to be made part of a philosophy.[119] Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how such criticism is possible if the intellect in its analytic activity actually falsifies reality. Intuition is regarded by Bergson as a form of knowledge, and is sometimes contrasted as "knowledge acted" with "knowledge represented." As a matter of fact, however, it is doubtful whether intuition, as he described it, has any right to be called knowledge. Many of his accounts indicate that at the moment of intuition, the subject is lost in the object, the cognitive element vanishes, and knowledge is replaced by either action or feeling. It is certainly misleading, therefore, to identify intuition with knowledge proper. As one of Bergson's critics says, "Knowledge in any of its degrees, is not and cannot without self-extinction become identical with being. It is being reflected in and for a rational mind; and philosophy is not life, but the attempted interpretation of life by means of reflective intelligence." [120]

IV

Our concluding paragraphs may profitably serve to crystallize the results of our discussion. We first considered Bergson's teaching concerning freedom with reference to human activity, and found three distinct meanings given to the term. Of these, creation or spontaneity is probably the most fundamental in Bergson's philosophy. The value of his discussion of this conception lies in his emphasis upon its relation to the reality of time. While

[119] Cf. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 191 ff.

[120] Stewart, *Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy*, p. 245.

this aspect of his philosophy is by no means unique, we may nevertheless safely say that nowhere else do we find a more emphatic assertion of the reality both of time and of creation, or a more thoroughgoing consideration of the objections to freedom which proceed from a failure to take into account the fact of time.

Freedom as indeterminateness likewise involves the reality of time. As characteristic of living centers of action, it points to a genuine pluralism. This conclusion, however, is precluded for Bergson by his emphasis upon the continuity of all centers of life with the vital impetus. By this emphasis, he is led to adopt a sort of monism—though a monism very different from that of absolutism.

Bergson's conception of freedom as the reflection of the whole personality resembles in many respects the familiar view of freedom as self-determination, or (as Bergson himself expresses it) of "moral freedom." Bergson is prevented, however, from doing justice to this conception through his distrust of teleology and of reason, and through his lack of appreciation of individuality. This conception of freedom can be brought into harmony with his view of freedom as spontaneity only by a denial that any particular act is more free than another. Hence, Bergson's account of freedom, like that of James, fails to provide for rational freedom.

The account of the relation of freedom to the vital impetus we have also found to present difficulties. The vital impetus is declared to be essentially free and creative, yet Bergson's description of this creative activity is by no means clear. He tells us that creation depends upon the conflict of freedom with necessity but fails to explain intelligibly or consistently the origin and meaning of necessity. His marvellously skilful use of images enables him to suggest to us the nature of the vital impetus, yet he leaves unanswered many important questions concerning its real nature. Is it conscious or unconscious, personal or impersonal, a unity or a plurality? Is its activity

analogous to a material force, to an irrational and merely sentient impulse, or to purposive volition? Bergson apparently regards the vital impetus as ultimately individual, but we have seen that this individuality is scarcely compatible with his denial of organization and harmony as regards its divergent tendencies. Furthermore, although Bergson declares that its activity is most comparable to volition, we have found that his rejection of rational purpose keeps him from really describing it as such.

Of course, analysis inevitably fails to do justice to a philosophy which is founded upon intuition, and which explicitly disavows any pretence of system or completeness. Bergson's writings abound in brilliant flashes of insight which stir the reader's imagination and carry him to the center of the problem at issue. Yet, since intuition alone is not a safe guide for philosophy, the affirmation of freedom on the ground of intuition cannot in itself afford a satisfactory philosophic solution of the problem.

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM AND PERSONAL IDEALISM

I

Bergson and James alike confidently affirm the reality of freedom in the sense both of contingency and of spontaneity. Neither of these thinkers, however, gives an adequate analysis of freedom as peculiarly characteristic of rational and purposive selves. In this respect, a useful supplement to their discussions may be found in the teaching of Prof. James Ward. For Ward, freedom is primarily a character of personal agents.[121] Hence the problem of freedom, in his opinion, centers about the nature of self-determination. While self-determination does, to be sure, imply contingency, it is the contingency of freedom that is implied, as distinct from the contingency of mere chance.[122] For this reason, the usual controversy between determinists and indeterminists fails to do justice to the real significance of the problem of freedom.

In this interpretation of freedom as pre-eminently personal, Ward represents the general attitude of personal idealists. His discussion, particularly in *The Realm of Ends*, is of interest, therefore, not only because of its own significance, which is great, but also as a clear expression of the view of freedom held by those who approach the problem from the point of view of a philosophy based upon a recognition of the nature and value of personality.

An account of Ward's doctrine of freedom may conveniently deal in turn with the following three points: first, the conception of freedom entertained and the arguments advanced in its behalf; second, the contention that free-

[121] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 272.

[122] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 454 f., Supplementary note 1; *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 4th edition, pp. 614 ff.

dom is characteristic of all parts of the universe; third, the relation of freedom to theism. Ward's conception of freedom, as has already been indicated, is thoroughly representative of personal idealism, and would be accepted almost in its entirety by all advocates of this position. His panpsychism and his theism, on the other hand, would not meet with the same agreement. The latter, however, is of especial importance for our purpose, since no discussion of typical views of freedom would be complete without some consideration of the problem from the point of view of religion.

II

To make clear the meaning of freedom as self-determination Ward employs the method of contrast. In the first place, he contrasts self-determination with mechanical determination, efficient and final causation with mechanical uniformity, the historical view-point with that of science—in a word "the realm of ends" with "the realm of nature." In the second place, in truly Kantian fashion, he contrasts the noumenal with the phenomenal, and distinguishes the standpoint of the subject from that of the object.

The first contrast may be illustrated by the ambiguity of the very word "determination." [123] We say that we are 'determined' to carry out a certain project; we say also that the motion of a body is 'determined' by various forces. To use Ward's example, we say that a traveller is determined to go on his way in spite of wind and dust, while we say also that the movement of the particles of dust against which he struggles is determined by the wind. Obviously 'determined' has a different meaning in the two cases. This difference our author expresses as follows: "In the first case determination implies efficient causation, self-direction and purpose: it does not imply any uniformity such that in all like circumstances a like de-

[123] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 277 ff.

termination always has recurred and always will. In the second case, on the other hand, this is precisely what is implied; whereas here nothing is implied as to efficient causation; also self-direction and purpose are either denied or treated as meaningless." [124]

We should not fail to note Ward's careful discrimination between the different causal terms.[125] In essential agreement with Bergson he states that, in the realm of activity from which the concept was originally derived, causation implies both efficiency and purpose. Both of these meanings, however, have been excluded by science in its application of the concept to the natural world. In this realm causality is regarded as neither active nor purposive but simply as observed uniformity. So understood, Ward says, mechanical causation involves neither empirical nor logical necessity; we never experience the "propter hoc" but only the "post hoc" in nature, and logic reveals no reason why phenomena succeed one another in a given way. Thus, the necessity which the scientist attributes to mechanical causation and to the uniformity of nature is merely a methodological postulate. Hence, mechanistic theory is unjustified in transforming this postulate into a statement of the fundamental nature of the universe and in attempting on this ground to prove the unreality of efficient and purposive causation.

Similar to the ambiguity of the term 'determination' is that of the word 'direction.'[126] Direction in the physical world is purely spatial and is absolutely determinate; direction in the human realm, on the other hand, represents control, guidance, and a relation of wills. Here again is manifest the contrast between the purely spatial world of the scientist and the world of history, comprising the activity of personal agents. Science presents us with a realm of mechanical necessity, void of individuality,

[124] *The Realm of Ends*, p. 278.
[125] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 273 ff.
[126] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 280 ff.

novelty, creation, and guidance. History, on the other hand, is a report of individual initiative and of the occurrence, through freedom, of new achievements and new conquests.

Determinists, however, deny that this difference, which prima facie seems so fundamental, is ultimate. They insist that the determination found in the realm of ends, is reducible to a form of the mechanical determination present throughout the realm of nature. Such a reduction, however, involves a careful examination of volition, and this analysis, Ward believes, shows only the more clearly the untenability of the determinists' claim.

Determinists declare that volition is the result of a conflict of motives. In a given situation, choice is determined by motives just as the movement of a body is determined by the forces acting upon it; a like necessity prevails in both cases. Now, though there is doubtless a certain superficial similarity between the play of motives and the action of forces, the differences between them are so fundamental that the comparison loses its significance. These differences are brought out so clearly by Ward, that his statement may be quoted in full. "Forces, though distinct, combine their effects only because they converge on one body: motives, though distinct, conflict only because they diverge, so to say, from one subject. The forces, that is, are applied to the body, the motives spring from the subject. The body moves in the one path which the forces collectively determine, the subject *moves* in the one path which it selectively determines. The magnitude of a force is referred to an objective standard, the strength of a motive depends on its subjective worth: the sufficient reason is in the one case mechanical, in the other it is teleological." [127] In view of such fundamental differences as these, it is clear that the composition of mechanical forces can throw little light on the process of volition.

[127] *The Realm of Ends*, p. 285.

The dispute about the relation of motives to choice is due, as a matter of fact, to a failure to realize that motives exist only for the self. Both determinists and indeterminists, Ward believes, make the mistake of thinking of motives apart from the self. Hence the indeterminist sometimes feels compelled to assert that the self decides without a motive—an assertion flagrantly untrue to experience—while the determinist declares that the action of the self is necessarily determined by the strongest motive and is therefore not free. The truth, Ward maintains, is that the self does decide in the direction of the strongest motive, but that the self is nevertheless free since the motive is but an expression of the self's own nature. The determinist may retort, "In that case, the nature of the self must determine the act." In this assertion Ward acquiesces, but maintains that it in no wise involves a denial of freedom.[128] The determination of the self by its nature is, he declares, identical with self-determination, since the nature is one with the self. Furthermore, such determination does not imply the necessity of any single act at a given time, for the self is never so fixed and limited in its nature that only one act is possible. Thus, according to Ward, the self may be said to determine its act, and to be the cause of its act, but it is also free since determination and causation do not, in the human realm, imply either necessity or uniformity. The fallacy of separating the self from its nature rests ultimately, in his belief, upon an associationist view of mind. Such a view, however, he declares to be a caricature of the real nature of mind. No justification may be found for speaking of nature or motives apart from the self. "To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders." [129] Indeed, the absurd consequences which result from carrying out a mechanistic view of mind to its logical conclusion is, Ward

[128] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 286 ff.

[129] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

declares, "an indirect proof of the reality of that self-determination which we directly experience." [130]

We must turn now to the second contrast, which Ward draws, that between the subject and the object. For him as for idealists generally the subject-object relation is the central fact of experience. Naturalistic thinkers so emphasize the object that they commonly lose sight of the fact that the object is known only in reference to the subject. Yet the world as object is, Ward believes, phenomenal, and as such is not self-existent, but is grounded in the noumenal order. To make clear his thought of the dependence of the phenomenal upon the noumenal, he reminds us of Lotzes' figure of a tapestry.[131] The pattern of the tapestry is the result of the activity of the weavers. Relations may be traced between the figures pictured there, but such relations throw not the least light upon the relation of the tapestry as a whole to the activity of the weavers by whom it was produced. Similarly the laws of causation apply only to relations within the phenomenal order, but cannot describe the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Thus, noumenal causation is absolutely independent of phenomenal necessity, and is therefore free. In passing, we may note that, although Ward's account of noumenal causation is founded upon Kant's teaching, he differs in his insistence that noumenal causation is genuinely temporal. Like Bergson, Ward teaches that time is absolutely real and that concrete time which is flowing must be distinguished from time which is past. Like Bergson also, he maintains that concrete time has not been taken into account by necessitarians. As he expresses it, "The necessitarian position . . . rests on the assumption that phenomena are the whole; that there is, in other words, nothing but filled time: whence and how time is filled, it does not enquire." [132] Since this

[130] *The Realm of Ends*, p. 291.
[131] *Ibid.*, pp. 302 f.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

assumption is unfounded and even contradictory, the necessitarian arguments are not conclusive.

The question of determinism cannot be so easily disposed of, however, since determinists of the absolutistic creed are still to be reckoned with. They would indeed agree, in a large measure, with Ward's refutation of mechanism, and would assent to his statement that there is a significant difference between saying that an act is determined by the self and saying that an act is determined *for* the self. Their point of opposition would be that rational self-determination necessarily precludes contingency, and that each act of the self is what it is by reference to its relation to the whole. What, then, has Ward to say with reference to this position? Part of his answer has already been suggested in the preceding paragraph. It is that such a view precludes the recognition of the reality of time. Furthermore, in his belief, absolutists or monists of any sort inevitably lose the many in their exaltation of the one.[133] They start with unity and attempt to derive the many from it, but in this attempt, Ward insists, they never succeed. Now whether or not the universe is ultimately one, at all events experience presents us with a plurality which we cannot deny. We have, our author maintains, a direct experience of human activity, human individuality, and human choice, and we have no right to throw aside these facts because of a desire for unity.[134] If absolutism were established, the denial of freedom would necessarily follow, but, since it is not proven, we need not sacrifice to it our experience of freedom. Whether or not this is an adequate statement of the relation between absolutism and freedom will be clearer after an examination of Bosanquet's discussion of the problem. For the present we merely note Ward's contention that determinism is justified neither by mechanism nor by absolutism.

[133] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture II.

[134] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 309, 351 f.

The foregoing discussion has shown that Ward, in essential agreement with James and Bergson, teaches that freedom implies novelty, spontaneity, and contingency. The distinct contribution of his conception lies in the emphasis which he lays on personal individuality and on purpose, and in his careful analysis of volition. The distinction which he draws between personal determination and mechanical causality would be satisfactory, in general, to most of those who recognize the reality of personality. There would be more difficulty, however, in regard to his statements concerning the relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal. His view that the phenomenal world is the product of the independent activity of a plurality of free selves does not altogether succeed in accounting for the actual uniformity which prevails in the world and which makes possible the successful use of the principle of mechanical causation. Indeed, the recognition of this uniformity and harmony in nature forces Ward himself, as we shall see, to supplement pluralism with theism. Again, it might be objected that there cannot be any ultimate contrast between the teleological and mechanical orders, inasmuch as the subject can, in Ward's opinion, become object, and so cannot as subject have a character absolutely incompatible with its character as object. This objection, however, loses force when we recall that the category of mechanical causation is not for our author ultimately valid, and that there may be *more* in the subject self than is ever presented in its character as object.

III

Although freedom is regarded by Ward as pre-eminently characteristic of personal agents, its range is by no means limited to the human realm. Through his interpretation of all reality by the subject-object relation, he concludes that, as the subject may become object, so ultimately

the object represents subject.[135] This view is rendered plausible for Ward both by his acceptance of continuity in nature and by the discovery of individuality in even the inanimate world. Moreover, the view is not, as one might at first suppose, incompatible with a recognition that nature exhibits laws. These laws are statistical in character, and say nothing concerning the spontaneity and variability of the subjects involved. These subjects are not, according to Ward, absolutely separate or unrelated entities—"monads without windows" but are interrelated in many complicated ways, and constantly influence one another in varying degrees. By their conflict and co-operation they create new meanings and thus give rise to a process of evolution. Hence their existence is compatible with the reality of actual novelty and creation. As Ward says, "To the pluralist, the so-called evolution of the world is really epigenesis, creative synthesis; it implies continual new beginnings, the result of the mutual conflict and co-operation of agents, all of whom, though in varying degrees, act spontaneously or freely. For the pluralist, in short, these agents are themselves creative." [136] A view of this sort, then, has a place for the recognition of the reality of time such as is incompatible with any philosophy that regards evolution as mechanically determined, or as the self-differentiation of the eternal.

While the question of the ultimate validity of Ward's panpsychism is undoubtedly of great interest, it does not intimately concern our problem, inasmuch as freedom in the human realm is not dependent upon its existence in other realms. Furthermore, Ward's conception of freedom, gained as it is from human experience, is as clear and as significant if it can be attributed only to human beings, as if it could be predicated of all parts of the universe.

[135] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, Lect. III.
[136] *Ibid.*, pp. 270 f.

IV

We come now to the question of the relation of freedom to theism. Ward bases his theistic belief on the fact that, although pluralism is theoretically tenable, it nevertheless points beyond itself to some unifying principle or ground. At its lower level, pluralism seems to issue in mere indeterminateness which needs a prime mover; at its upper level, it points beyond a plurality of wills and purposes to an Ideal which unifies the purposive activity of all. Moreover, the very fact that individuals co-operate as they do and build up such remote and complex trains of relationship indicates that they are not an absolute plurality but are connected through their relation to a single Ground. As Ward expresses it, "A plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence, and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity, seems clearly to suggest some ground beyond itself. The idea of God presents itself to meet this lack." [137]

God as the Supreme Ground of the World, Ward maintains, is immanent in the world and yet transcends it. The world which is constituted by the plurality of selves owes its very existence to God; these selves have nevertheless a measure of independence and freedom of their own. This relationship between God and the world is what Ward designates as "creation." [138] Creation, in his opinion, does not signify a temporal relation, but rather the logical relation of dependence. God's creative activity is, he declares, comparable not to the relation of the potter to his clay, but to the begetting of life by life, or better still, to the artist's creation of a masterpiece. The work of art owes its existence to the artist, and is a partial expression of his mind; nevertheless it has a freedom and individuality of its own which the artist must respect. That this relation between the artist and his work may

[137] *The Realm of Ends*, p. 241. [138] Cf. *ibid.*, Lecture XI.

serve as a suggestive, though a rough, analogue of the relation of God to His world, may be granted. As Ward himself realizes, however, the analogy breaks down at several important points. In the first place, the relation described is temporal. The artist creates his work at a given moment of time; after that time his creation exists through itself, relatively independent of the fate which may befall the creator. The world, on the contrary, continually depends for its existence on God. Moreover, the artist works in a medium which he does not create, while God creates absolutely. The failure of the illustration is inevitable, since no human and finite analogue can ever give an adequate conception of the Divine nature. Creation is a transcendent idea, and can therefore never be fully apprehended by the finite mind. As Ward confesses, *how* God acts, *how* God creates we can never know, yet this, he contends, does not entitle us to deny His activity.

But is the view of creation just outlined compatible with the genuine freedom of finite selves? Ward admits that *prima facie* the two seem incompatible, yet he maintains that this incompatibility is not absolute. God is great enough to create actual creators.[139] Such creation does, to be sure, involve a genuine limitation of God. Since this limitation is willed and created by God Himself, however, it does not detract from His greatness, but rather enhances it.[140] Furthermore if the existence of freedom seems to conflict with God's attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, these attributes must be surrendered, for we have no apriori knowledge of God's nature from which we can deduce the character of the universe. Thus Ward maintains that God is not omnipotent, if omnipotence excludes man's freedom. He is not omniscient, if omniscience includes a knowledge of the future, since such knowledge would involve a denial both of time and of

[139] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 271.
[140] *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.

freedom.[141] Deterministic theologians have held that God can foreknow a man's acts through His complete knowledge of man's nature. Yet such prediction would also demand a knowledge of the whole future course of events, and the possibility of such knowledge is precluded, in Ward's opinion as in Bergson's, by the reality of time. Furthermore, man's nature is not a given entity that can be known completely at any one moment of time. As Ward says, "Surely if there is an empirical commonplace beyond dispute, it is this, that no man knows beforehand even his own possibilities completely, to say nothing of those of another." [142] This changeable aspect of man's nature finds a conspicuous expression in such experiences as cases of sudden conversion, but it is also characteristic of man's ordinary development. Since this change is not merely apparent but real, foreknowledge is impossible even to the Infinite Mind. In spite of this fact, however, God is not left a victim to surprise or disappointment, since He Himself knows the limitations within which the finite moves. Thus, Ward does not ascribe to God such absolute ignorance of the future as Bergson predicates of the vital impetus.

There are undoubtedly many difficulties in Ward's reconciliation of freedom with theism. In his endeavor to make God both transcendent and immanent, he often seems to waver between a deistic and an absolutistic position. On the one hand, his insistence upon the freedom of finite selves, seems to demand their complete separation from God. On the other hand, his affirmation of the relation of all finite selves to a single Supreme Ground seems to lead away from pluralism toward an absolutistic position, and thus, on his own premises, to endanger his assertion of freedom and individuality. If God is, as Ward affirms, the logical ground of all finite selves, does not He Himself so work through them that their

[141] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 294 ff. [142] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

activity is ultimately His? God, Ward maintains, assigns talents which individuals use or misuse.[143] Yet the very power or will which uses or misuses talents is grounded in God, and so would seem to be ultimately His. To this sort of criticism, Ward might reply by emphasizing once more the reality of the many. He would declare that we must maintain the characteristics actually found in the many, and content ourselves with postulating the ideal to which the unity in experience points. If this ideal seems incompatible with these characteristics, we may assume that this incompatibility is due to the limitation of our apprehension of a transcendent idea. Creation, if true, cannot be incompatible with the actual experience of personality and freedom, and we understand its significance so little that we are in no position to state its logical implications.

Now this recourse to the inconceivability of creation cannot, of course, be satisfactory from the logical point of view, as it cannot solve the difficulties in regard to the relation between man's freedom and his dependence upon God. Yet it is worth while to note in passing that a view like Ward's seems to accord better with the demands of religion and morality, than does either extreme pluralism or absolute monism. It meets the demands of our moral nature, inasmuch as it places the responsibility for evil squarely upon finite selves, and yet offers a rational ground for confidence in the final triumph of the good. It satisfies religious demands by making God the supreme ground of all life, without denying to his creatures the individuality and freedom which give significance to their obedience, sacrifice, worship, and love.

We conclude our discussion of Ward's doctrine of freedom by re-affirming that the chief value of this doctrine lies in its emphasis upon personality. Since the problem of freedom concerns primarily the activity of personal

[143] Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 315.

agents, it cannot be adequately dealt with apart from a consideration of personality. Furthermore, the recognition of the value and meaning of personality is absolutely indispensable for any view of freedom that pretends to do justice to the ethical aspect of the problem.

CHAPTER VI

BOSANQUET'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

I

In his recent Gifford lectures, Bosanquet expresses a view of freedom which may be regarded as representative of the doctrine of absolutists generally. This view differs almost *in toto* from the conceptions which we have just been discussing. James, Bergson, and Ward all alike regard freedom as spontaneity and novelty, and look for it in the discontinuity and contingency of the universe. Bosanquet, on the contrary, maintains that freedom is completely rational, and that it is possible only in a logical and coherent universe. Far from searching for evidence of contingency or of discontinuity, he welcomes the evidence for law, asserting that a gap or break in the continuity of the universe would imperil freedom. In opposition to Bergson's assertion that freedom is essentially indefinable, Bosanquet affirms that it is possible to describe its real nature. He declares that it is "the nisus to the whole, the ἔρως or spirit of union which is at once logic and love;" [144] "the passage of a being or content beyond itself;" "ideality, adjustment." [145] Or, again, he describes it as the characteristic of "a world which reshapes itself in virtue of its nature and that of its contents, and, in doing so, extends its borders, and absorbs and stamps itself upon something that before seemed alien." [146]

The bare statement of these descriptions of freedom may have served to indicate Bosanquet's position. Our next task is to present his view more clearly, and in more detail.

[144] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 9.
[145] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 60.
[146] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

We shall then be in a better position to discuss certain difficulties which seem to inhere in his teaching concerning the freedom of finite selves. In conclusion, we shall consider briefly freedom as characteristic not of the finite but of the Absolute.

II

For Bosanquet, freedom is one with the principle of the logical coherence of the whole. It is the dialectic process immanent in reality itself according to which each part ultimately transcends itself and seeks to identify itself with the whole. This self-transcendence is found, moreover, in every pulse of experience, in feeling and will as well as in logical thought.[147] Inasmuch as freedom consists in this very process of self-transcendence, it can never be found in any sort of immediacy. Hence Bosanquet opposes uncompromisingly the tendency of James, Ward, and Bergson, to find freedom in the immediate, and to exalt immediacy above conceptual thinking.[148] In his opinion, life is not more than logic; on the contrary, logic is the revelation of the true meaning of life, and is therefore higher than mere life. Freedom then is not given in the merely immediate, but is an expression of the rational process at the very heart of reality.

Bosanquet's teaching of the complete rationality of freedom leads him to deny to it the least implication of contingency or of discontinuity. This, however, does not imply a rejection of spontaneity, since, in his opinion, law does not rest upon the repetition of similar elements, but is the systematization of many diverse elements into a logical whole.[149] Causation, then, in this sense, is the very condition both of freedom, and of purposive activity. In his words, "Where there is (or appears to be) discontinuity, as tested by these characteristics of an in-

[147] Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 59 ff.
[148] *Ibid.*, pp. 13 ff.
[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 91 ff.

telligible whole, there inevitably is (or appears to be) *pro tanto* a gap in the embodiment of spiritual purpose and significance. A purpose is not realized, it is not a reality as penetrating and vivifying a mass of content, if it is not affirmed continuously and traceably in a coherent structure. No purpose or significance can be realized through miracle." [150] Hence the reality of a completely unified whole is, for Bosanquet, the necessary condition of the reality of freedom as characteristic of purposive agents.

This conception of the relation of freedom to the whole of reality is fundamental to Bosanquet's discussion of the will and power of the finite self. In his opinion, the will itself is not an abstract principle or an empty form opposed to nature but is rather a part of nature "come alive." [151] It is molded by the environment; yet in so far as it acquires a nature of its own, it can react upon the environment and determine what it can or will accept. However, the will can never separate itself from its environment; both its content and its power depend upon its relation to the whole of reality. Its content is found in those great social embodiments of will, civilization, and society. Such achievements are, indeed, the best proof of the reality of will or of spiritual power. They depend, to be sure, upon finite selves; yet, on the other hand, finite selves come to their full expression only through participation in the social whole. As Bosanquet says, "We are finding ourself in the world, as the world comes to life in ourself." [152] This intimate relation between the finite self and the larger world is, moreover, the source of any power that the finite self can possess. Through it, he is enabled to have insight into the nature both of himself and of the problem which confronts him, and this insight is the necessary condition of his power. To be sure, Bosanquet recognizes that "courage, resolution, decision" are also

[150] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 141.
[151] Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, Lectures III and IV.
[152] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

conditions of the power of will, but he emphasizes the fact that all of these can achieve their results only through insight, and that this insight depends upon the relation of each fact or aspect of reality to the whole. Hence freedom, in the sense of the power of the finite will is, for Bosanquet, rooted in the systematic unity and harmony of the Absolute.

This view of freedom may be made clearer, and fresh light on the whole problem may be gained, Bosanquet believes, by an examination of artistic creation. Here the issue is clear. Does such creation consist in pure spontaneity and novelty, or is it completely rational—the revelation of the deeper meaning inherent in reality itself? The latter is, of course, Bosanquet's own view. In opposition to thinkers like Bergson and James, he maintains that creation consists not in the production of novelty, but rather in the expression of the rational process immanent in reality. Thus, the imagination is creative when it is penetrative, rather than when it is originative, and its highest task lies in the discernment and embodiment of the fundamental significance of reality. As Bosanquet expresses it, "If it (the imagination) is 'creative,' it is so because profound penetration reveals positive treasures beyond the scope of the average mind; not because it deviates into paths of arbitrary fantasy. In short, then, all logical activity is a world of content reshaping itself by its own spirit and laws in presence of new suggestions; a syllogism is in principle nothing less, and a Parthenon or 'Paradise Lost' is in principle nothing more." [153] In passing, it is of interest to note that, in spite of profound differences, this view of creation has a point of agreement with the teaching of Bergson. Bergson likewise insists that the artist or the creative thinker must get at the heart of reality itself and trace its movements and process. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that he regards intuition as indispensable. He, however, differs fundamentally

[153] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 333.

in the description which he gives of the reality thus revealed. He affirms that reality is absolutely inexplicable in conceptual terms; Bosanquet, on the contrary, maintains that it is the very incarnation of logic.

The description of artistic creation as the expression of the rational process of reality discloses, Bosanquet believes, the real meaning of all creative and free activity. "The creative freedom of art," he declares, "is what we offer as the type of the characteristic logic or movement of the self. . . . Life—to which we are so often referred as the true continuity or active duration—is nothing in the world but a lower phase of an analogous logic related to human activity as a hill or a cloud to a Turner sketch of it, or as a bird's song to the Iliad. What we are here offered is a share in the eternal deed which constitutes reality, and I am unable to see what more than this our largest wishes can demand." [154]

With this brief sketch of Bosanquet's doctrine before us, we may turn to the question whether this doctrine can be carried through consistently. Can the freedom of the finite self, as described by our author, be compatible with the logical completeness of the whole upon which its power is said to depend? Our negative reply to this question rests on three main contentions: (1), that finite freedom involves time, and hence is incompatible with the eternal completeness of the whole, (2), that Bosanquet himself does not adhere strictly to his own conception of freedom, but sometimes admits an element of contingency, (3) that the subordination of the moral standpoint to the standpoint of logic undermines the ground for the assertion of freedom.

III

The definitions of freedom which we quoted in our opening section all imply the reality both of time and of the finite. For, if time is not real, there is no meaning in

[154] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 334.

expressions such as "nisus to the whole," or "passage," or self-transcendence, and if finiteness is mere appearance, the "passage of a content beyond itself" cannot be regarded as a genuine achievement. Is, then, the reality of time and of the finite compatible with the logical completeness of the whole as formulated in absolutism? Let us consider briefly our author's reply to this crucial question.

Bosanquet maintains that there is no incompatibility between the temporal sequence and the eternal perfection of the whole. The temporal view-point is necessitated by finiteness, and, like the latter, has its measure of reality by reason of its relation to the whole. To quote: "Time is real as a condition of the experience of sensitive subjects, but it is not a form which profoundly exhibits the unity of things." [155] Or again: "We consider time as an appearance only, . . . but as an appearance inseparable from the membership of finiteness in infinity, and therefore from the self-revelation of a reality which as a whole is timeless." [156] Thus, for our author, the whole is timeless, not in the sense of excluding time, but rather in the sense of including and transcending it. Yet, as various critics have pointed out, it is difficult to see how such an inclusion is possible. Can past, present, and future be eternally present as elements in a complete whole? What meaning would there be then in speaking of the past as past, or the future as future? To questions such as these, Bosanquet might reply that the difficulty is due to the attempt to interpret in temporal terms what he says of the whole. He maintains no such absurdity as that present, past, and future are given now or at any other moment of time. Rather he maintains that time itself is so beset with contradictions that it inevitably forces the mind to transcend it. This, indeed, is what he means by calling time appearance. Now, although difficulties in the con-

[155] *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 273.

[156] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 295 f.

ception of time must be admitted even by the most radical temporalist, yet these difficulties do not justify us in neglecting one of the most fundamental aspects of our experience, or in subordinating it to the demand for logical completeness. Furthermore, the insistence upon the fact that the logical completeness of the whole cannot be described in temporal terms, throws little light on the problem of how our radically temporal experience can be included in this perfect whole.

The reader of Bosanquet's volumes finds many assertions to the effect that the logical order is inclusive of the temporal. He seeks in vain, however, for any passage which actually shows how such an inclusion is possible. There are, indeed, several illustrations which are offered as hints of this relationship.[157] These illustrations comprise: (a) the feelings and conditions of a great family, revealed in a series of acts, but not reducible to a mere temporal succession; (b) a musical composition, which is more than a sequence of tones, although expressed through this sequence; (c) the mind of a great scholar who apprehends the spirit of the past and thus transcends time. Significant as these illustrations are as showing the reality of a supratemporal aspect of experience, they all fail to meet the real difficulty involved in the inclusion of the temporal within an eternally perfect whole. In each of these analogies, the whole, which is supposed to furnish the analogue for the Absolute, changes with time, and is complete only as a synthesis of past experience. A brief examination will bear out the truth of this statement. The family feeling, "the concentration and quintessence of the spatio-temporal series," far from being eternally complete is progressively transformed through the very process of its expression in time. The musical composition does not exist as a complete whole even in the musician's mind until after its expression in a temporal sequence. According to this illustration, then, the Absolute would

[157] Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 296 ff.

be complete only at the end of the temporal series. In our author's opinion, however, time is essentially unending and so could never give us a complete whole. The way of escape lies, perhaps, in a different interpretation of the illustration. Thus, Bosanquet sometimes implies that the musical composition expresses only imperfectly a state of mind or a feeling experienced by the musician. This state of mind exists in its perfection in the musician's own mind and is not dependent upon its imperfect and often fragmentary expression. But if this interpretation be seriously accepted as furnishing an analogue of the relation of time to the Absolute, the Absolute must exist complete—apart from its temporal manifestation. The temporal series then is but a fragmentary representation of that which is in itself perfect and complete. But since the whole is complete without this representation, the temporal series cannot be included within the perfection of the whole nor necessitated by it. Thus the musical composition, from whatever angle it be considered, fails to show how time falls within the logical perfection of the Absolute. Bosanquet's third-mentioned illustration serves his purpose no better. The scholar is freed, in truth, from many limitations of time and space. His experience and knowledge are not confined to a moment of time. Yet his knowledge has been built bit by bit upon experience that is past, and he can see only so much of the future as is grounded in the past or present. Hence his mind furnishes no hint of that eternal intellectual intuition of the Absolute which includes all time in its grasp. There is another illustration to which Bosanquet often returns. In his opinion, the logical syllogism and the judgment furnish the best clue to the eternal experience of the Absolute, and here if anywhere a suggestion concerning the nature of the whole may be found. The relation of subject to predicate, or of premise to conclusion is not temporal, although our apprehension of it may be such.[158] Thus,

[158] Cf. *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 87 f.; Vol. II., pp. 5 ff.

the judgment which sustains the universe—the absolute totality in which all differences are unified—is itself timeless. The significance of this judgment lies in the assertion of unity in difference, and this unity is eternally present. The fact that it is known by us only under the form of succession is an accident due to our finiteness rather than a representation of its real nature. Although this description of the judgment suggests how the universe may be regarded as a timeless and rational whole, it does not show how time is included in this whole. Here again the logical and the temporal aspects fall apart, and we are left with the problem of the relation of our successive apprehension of difference to that eternal judgment in which all differences are aspects of a unified system.

The difficulty of reconciling the temporal and logical standpoints is indicated not only by Bosanquet's failure to show how such a reconciliation is possible, but also by the difficulties into which he continually falls through his endeavor to maintain both standpoints. As an illustration of this point, let me cite the question of the relation of the Absolute to evolution. From the logical point of view, the Absolute must be regarded as prior to all change. Indeed, Bosanquet frequently gives the Absolute a priority even from the temporal point of view. To quote from his Gifford lectures: "We are then to make the attempt to show in outline how the Absolute, seen from our side as a world of appearances, keeps throwing its content into living focuses, vortices, worlds; and how these again, each transmuting towards unity its realm of externality and eliciting its values, initiate and sustain the character in which, under the special emphasis lent by the special dissociation operative at that point, the Absolute appears." [159] But while the Absolute is here given a certain priority, it should also be observed that in so far as it is elicited and maintained by the activity of finite selves, the Absolute is a late product of evolution, since,

[159] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 69.

in Bosanquet's opinion, finite selves can come into existence only as the result of a long process of unconscious evolution.[160] We might even say that the Absolute, from this point of view, represents the goal of the effort of the finite selves rather than an eternal achievement. It may be objected that the contradiction here cited, is due to the misleading attempt to describe in temporal terms the relation of the Absolute to its expressions. Yet it is significant that Bosanquet himself does not keep clear of such an attempt. The consequent inconsistencies of his statements may therefore well be regarded as evidence, not of the illusory nature of time, but rather of the fundamental irreconcilability of time and the eternal.

This incompatibility of the logical and the temporal standpoints in an absolutistic system entails the relegation of freedom to the realm of appearance. If, as absolutism teaches, the whole is eternally complete, and the finite is eternally one with the infinite, then the nisus to the whole, the process of self-transcendence, and all finite striving are but illusory.

Let us turn now to the consideration of our second point, i. e., to the contention that Bosanquet himself does not adhere strictly to his own definition of freedom. He declares time and again that freedom is completely rational, that it differs *in toto* from contingency. One who fully examines his discussions of finite freedom, however, will discover at least the implication of an element of contingency. The same fact comes out with even greater clearness in connection with his treatment of the problem of evil. Evil, as well as good, is said to be necessitated by its relation to the whole. In apparent contradiction to this view, however, it is also maintained that, in principle, evil or the seizing of a false clue is never necessary. "*In principle*, a fruitful thought and course is *always open;* for the whole of the universe is accessible by some path or other from every complex within it. In principle,

[160] Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 157, 218 ff.

again, you—the finite mind—have *always* a clue to a relatively fruitful thought or act, because every demand of mind, pressed thoroughly home, must ultimately bring you to all that mind can be. Thus to fail of fruitful thought or choice is in the main to fail, as we all constantly fail, in sincerity and thoroughness." [161] This admission that failure is due to lack of sincerity or of thoroughness seems to imply the possibility of action being other than it is, and thereby to open the door to contingency. Bosanquet, however, guards against this impression by assuring us in the next sentence, that "we need not here discuss whether there is sense in saying 'we *could* have been more sincere and unselfish, or . . . more relevantly inspired, than we were.'" To this question his system can give only a negative answer, though Bosanquet maintains that the question itself is based on the fallacious idea of an empty free will, and is therefore misleading. Yet if the question is put aside, or if the negative answer is accepted, apparently the significance of the statement that in principle a path is open vanishes. For how can the path be said to be really open for the self, if that self is so circumscribed and limited that it must necessarily fail to find the path? [162] Here our author might remind us of the distinction which he makes between a necessary act and a necessary agent. He says that his view "recognizes a necessary act, an act which must be what it is, but not a necessary agent, because nothing but the agent determines the act, and there is no meaning in applying to him any 'must' or 'cannot help it' except in the sense that everything is what it is." [163] Yet it is questionable whether the self can be justly regarded as having so definite and circumscribed

[161] *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 108.

[162] In a completely logical system, a path which is *in principle* open would seem necessarily to be actually open. If such is the case, however, the explanation of evil vanishes.

[163] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 354 f.

a nature as to necessitate but a single specific act. Indeed, Bosanquet himself constantly affirms that the self is always more than it appears, and hence cannot be limited to any given act. The way out of this difficulty lies, perhaps, in taking refuge in the distinction between the temporal and logical view-points. From the temporal point of view, the self is at any moment limited and circumscribed, and hence fails to find the fruitful path; from the logical point of view, the self is one with the infinite, and so must always find the fruitful path even through "hardship and hazard." However this only brings us back to our former difficulty. If we decline to become entangled in this problem again, we must insist that the seizing of the wrong clue in a world where the good is in principle possible, is inexplicable unless contingency is admitted. But, as Bosanquet himself so constantly affirms, the admission of the least element of contingency means a gap in the logical completeness of the whole, and is therefore fatal to Absolutism.

The treatment of finite freedom is further weakened by our author's tendency to subordinate the moral to the logical view-point. The duality between the temporal and the logical appears also in his discussion of morality. We are told, on the one hand, that the perfection of the whole is achieved through finite moral endeavor,[164] and yet, on the other hand, that the perfection of the whole transcends moral distinctions and is only imperfectly represented in moral striving.[165] The former statement does justice to the demands of the moral life; the latter is more consistent with Bosanquet's principles. In general, his tendency is to regard morality as bound up with finiteness and time, and therefore as subordinate to the logical completeness of the whole.[166] If our contention

[164] Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 243, 371, 382.

[165] Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 307, 328.

[166] Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 17; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 193–194, 200–201, 212 f.

concerning the incompatibility of the logical and the temporal is justified, morality, involving as it does time, must be illusory from the point of view of the Absolute. This means that the ground for the assertion of freedom is destroyed, inasmuch as the demand for freedom arises primarily in the moral realm.

Our conclusion then is that freedom as an attribute of the finite is not possible in a universe which is a coherent, changeless, and eternal whole. The only possibility of saving freedom without abandoning absolutism lies in attributing freedom not to the finite, but to the Absolute, This brings us to the final section of our discussion, i. e., to the question of the freedom of the Absolute.

IV

Bosanquet sometimes maintains that freedom, in its full sense, can be ascribed only to the Absolute. Freedom, like truth and reality, is a matter of degree. It is the end of the effort of the finite self, rather than a characteristic of his striving, and it is attained only in so far as such a self is one with the Absolute. The definitions which we quoted above obviously do not relate to this sort of freedom, since they imply the reality of time and of finiteness. What, then, is freedom as a characteristic of the Absolute? Once more we shall avail ourselves of Bosanquet's definition. Freedom is equivalent to determinateness. It implies the adequate response of each part to the demands of the whole. As contrasted with merely mechanical causation, it is "a living and concrete world of appreciation, in which the whole quality of every element is capable in principle of bearing upon and responding to the whole quality of every other." [167] In a word, freedom is equivalent to logical coherence. It cannot escape notice, however, that the conception of logical coherence has so little in common with the ordinary meaning of

[167] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 342.

freedom, that it is confusing to identify the two terms. Furthermore, as Sabine has pointed out in his admirable criticism of Bosanquet's Logic, the idea of absolute coherence, or of absolute totality eludes our grasp.[168] The human mind is essentially selective, and cannot conceive a system which is all-inclusive. All systems, as we know them, are bounded by certain limits set by the dominating purpose. The Absolute, however, has no limits whatsoever since there is nothing without it; furthermore, according to Bosanquet, the Absolute is not unified by purpose, since purpose implies defect and striving. Indeed, Bosanquet himself admits that absolute totality can never be reached by discursive reasoning, as judgment is compelled to describe reality in a relational form.[169] Hence freedom as complete rationality or logical coherence transcends the limitations of the finite mind, and can be grasped only by recourse to mystic contemplation.

Waiving the matter relating to the intelligibility of absolute freedom, we come back to the fundamental difficulty inherent in the whole formulation of absolutism. We are face to face once more with the old problem of the relation of the temporal to the eternal. The incompatibility of the two involves the separation of the Absolute from the finite world. On the one hand, we find the eternal and unchanging experience of the Absolute, and on the other hand, the finite world of struggle and striving, of change and time. On the one hand, there is complete reality and complete perfection; on the other, appearance and finiteness. Now such a separation of the Absolute and the finite, of reality and appearance, can never be admitted by the absolutist, for the principal tenet of his creed is that apart from the finite the Absolute is nothing, and that the Absolute achieves and manifests its perfection only through the transcendence of the imperfect and incomplete. But if this doctrine be strictly held, it

[168] Cf. *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 546–565.

[169] Cf. *Logic*, 2d edition, Vol. II, p. 290.

is evident that the Absolute must stand or fall with the finite. If finite struggles are illusory, the Absolute elicited by these struggles must be illusory also. On the other hand, if finiteness and time are real, then the Absolute must itself be temporal. Realized through the finite, it must change and grow with each change in the finite. This conception of the Absolute leaves room for finite freedom, but it banishes the rigid coherence, the complete logical stability, i. e., the "freedom" of the whole. Hence it means the abandonment of absolutism.

We conclude, then, that Bosanquet's absolutism is not compatible with freedom. Finite freedom is ruled out by reason of its temporal implications and presuppositions. The freedom of the Absolute, on the contrary, is so rigidly logical in character that it can exist only in a complete and timeless whole. The difficulty here is that this whole must be isolated from the finite and temporal world. This, however, is as fatal to Bosanquet's system as the admission of contingency or of time, for the isolation of the Absolute from the finite is subversive of the main thesis of absolutism.

Our criticism of Bosanquet's discussion of freedom must not blind us to its value. His conception of freedom emphasizes the fact that freedom need not be considered as an incarnation of caprice or irrationality. His identification of freedom with complete rationality points to the goal, rather than describes the actual condition of man's freedom. Although man may be free to do good *or* evil, yet as his ethical consciousness develops, he will express his freedom in acts that are progressively more rational. Finally, as Bosanquet's greatest contribution to the problem, we would again stress his insistence that the self is not an existent substantial entity with definite limits, but is an ever widening life capable of embracing more and more of reality. Thus, man's true freedom lies not in his self-subsistence as a bit of reality separate from all others, but in his power continually to enrich his experience by

entering into the lives of others, and by identifying himself with great movements and causes. Yet we must not overlook a fact of which Bosanquet was neglectful, namely, that there is always a self-reference which prevents the self from ever losing itself in another self or in the Absolute. Furthermore, this process of self-transcendence is not eternally true nor logically necessary, but is a contingent expression of the finite will, and a real process in time. It is only thus that we can do justice to the freedom of the finite self, or to the reality of time and of progress. Bosanquet, indeed, could not give due significance to progress, because of his insistence upon the timeless character of the whole. And yet he admits that there is genuine progress in one direction at least, i. e., in our apprehension of the real meaning and significance of freedom.[170]

[170] Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 317.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Our concluding task is to gather together the threads of our discussion in order to see whither it has led us. This task we shall best accomplish by comparing the various doctrines, bringing out their likenesses and differerences, and indicating their values and defects.

The attractiveness of Haeckel's view lies in its extreme simplicity. According to this view an absolute denial of freedom is the necessary outcome of the acceptance of causation. Unfortunately for mechanistic determinists, however, the problem cannot be so readily solved. In the first place, even in the material world, there is no proof that mechanical causation is universal. Indeed, if time is real, and evolution is genuinely progressive, then, as Bergson, Ward, and James alike show, mechanical causation cannot be universal. In the second place, in the psychic realm, the category of mechanical causation is inherently unsatisfactory, since conscious experience has a forward look—a teleological reference—that precludes the possibility of its interpretation solely by reference to the past. In the realm of consciousness, ideals and purposes are dominant factors, and these lose their significance if interpreted mechanically. Hence there is justification for the vigorous protest on the part of many philosophers against any attempt to read volition in terms of mechanical causation. Furthermore, the concept of causation itself is full of difficulties. When examined carefully, it either becomes intelligible solely by reference to our experience of activity, or points beyond the conception of the determination of the present by the past, to the idea of a system including past, present, and future. Regarding causation from this latter point of view, Bo-

sanquet has good grounds for his substitution of the concept of relevance for that of mechanical causation. Considerations such as these show that it is impossible to dispose of the problem of freedom by a mere assertion of the universal validity of mechanism.

The next three views discussed by us have, as we have seen, a number of points in common. James, Ward, and Bergson agree that freedom implies the reality of change, of time, and of contingency. Moreover, they alike assert that freedom is revealed in our immediate consciousness of our own activity. They therefore oppose vigorously any attempt to deny freedom on account of intellectualistic scruples. Significant as these points of resemblance are, our discussion has revealed interesting differences between the three views.

In regard to the protest against intellectualism, Ward is far less radical than either James or Bergson. The two latter thinkers, indeed, are frankly anti-intellectualistic, declaring vigorously that concepts are inherently incapable of describing freedom and activity. Yet at this point there is a divergence between James and Bergson also. The former declares that freedom is revealed in perceptual experience; the latter maintains that it is accessible only to that means of deeper apprehension or insight which he calls intuition. Again, Ward is less radical than either James or Bergson with respect to the question of contingency. All three thinkers accept the reality of contingency, but Ward affirms that it is limited by the presence of a single World Ground.

In regard to the question of the nature of freedom, we find an important difference between the opinions of the three writers whom we are now considering. For Bergson, the most fundamental conception of freedom is that of mere spontaneity—the creative activity of life as such. For Ward, on the contrary, freedom is preeminently personal and spiritual. James here occupies a mediating position. In many of his discussions he seems

to approximate very closely to the view of Bergson, while at other times his interest in the human aspect of the problem and his identification of freedom with choice bring him nearer to Ward. From the interest of both James and Ward in the human side of freedom, arises another important point of contrast between their discussions on the one hand, and that of Bergson on the other. The two former constantly emphasize the ethical aspect of freedom, examining eagerly and carefully the bearing of freedom on such questions as responsibility, regret, evil, etc. Bergson, on the contrary, almost entirely ignores these problems; his prime concern is the discovery of the nature of the world process—the vindication of the reality of time.

This introduces a further point in which we find Bergson aligned against James and Ward. For Bergson, individuality is at best incomplete; the individual is but a "little rill in the great river of life." For James and Ward, on the other hand, individuality is of paramount importance. Hence Bergson inclines toward a monistic view, while Ward and James are explicitly pluralistic in their teaching. Here a comparison of the views of James and Ward shows that James is the more radical, inasmuch as Ward introduces into his pluralistic view the thought of a single World Ground that unifies the separate selves.

Were we asked to state succinctly the special contribution of each of these philosophers to the problem, we should say: Bergson shows the relation of freedom to time and to creation; James goes further in that he connects freedom with pluralism as well as with contingency. Ward adds as his particular contribution a careful account of freedom as characteristic of personal agents. Although Ward is often inclined to compromise, and so falls into difficulties avoided by the more radical thinkers, his discussion does more justice to the complexity of the issue than do theirs. He does not, as we have seen, identify the problem of freedom with the question of the mere

existence of contingency or of novelty, but considers carefully the precise nature and implications of personal volition. A thoroughgoing analysis of this kind is indispensable, for the problem of freedom arises primarily in the ethical realm. Hence it is that the standpoint of personal idealism represented by Ward, even though unable to afford an adequate solution of all the difficulties, nevertheless offers a peculiarly advantageous approach to the problem of freedom.

Bosanquet's discussion terminates, we have seen, in a denial of the existence of contingency, and in an assertion of the reality of freedom, first, as the power or self-transcendent striving of the finite self, and second, as the complete rationality of the Absolute. Our examination, however, led to the conclusion that neither of these conceptions can be carried out satisfactorily in Bosanquet's thoroughly monistic system. The principal difficulties in the way of Bosanquet's success we found to be that of reconciling the temporal aspect of striving with the completeness of the whole. His failure, therefore, we regard as indirect evidence for the claim that freedom implies the reality of time, and is incompatible with monism.

Additional evidence in support of the latter point may be found by noting a significant similarity between doctrines as widely distinct as those of Bergson and Bosanquet. In both cases a monistic tendency leads to a subordination of the individual to the whole, and to a substitution of the freedom of the whole for the freedom of the finite self. In both cases, moreover, the resulting conception of freedom is one that transcends human knowledge. There is, as it is probably unnecessary for us again to emphasize, a vast difference between the monism implied in Bergson's view and that contended for by Bosanquet. All the more interesting, therefore, is the fact that these two sorts of monism involve similar results as regards the reality of human freedom. In reference to the ques-

tion of the relation of monism to freedom, we should note also the increased difficulties with regard to freedom that enter with Ward's introduction of a monistic principle.

Must we then conclude that pluralism alone is compatible with the reality of freedom? Apparently there is no escape from this conclusion so long as freedom involves contingency. We are brought then to the crucial question as to whether contingency is necessary for freedom. An affirmative answer to this question seems to be demanded by the moral consciousness. The moral consciousness is concerned with the reality of the freedom of the finite self, not of any cosmic being, and the freedom of the finite implies the reality both of time and of contingency. Furthermore, even though mere contingency does not by itself insure moral activity, the significance of such activity depends upon the reality of contingency. For, if contingency is not real, if all occurs according to rigid necessity, then the facts of obligation and of responsibility lose their significance. In support of the contention that freedom in any significant sense involves contingency, we may call to mind that even in those cases in which freedom was defined as self-expression, as rational activity, as the activity of the noumenal self, etc., we detected an implication that if the self *would* it could attain this freedom. For instance, the Stoics imply that man can if he will accept willingly whatever destiny brings, and so attain the freedom of the sage. Or again, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel alike imply that man is responsible for the attainment of rational freedom. Indeed, even an extreme rationalist like Bosanquet does not, we contend, succeed in avoiding at least an implication of contingency. Hence the claim that freedom in the sense of contingency is a postulate of the moral life seems valid.

The existence of contingency, however, cannot be so readily affirmed, for the demands of the will here conflict with the demands of the reason. If contingency is a pos-

tulate of the moral life, necessity is a postulate of the rational consciousness, and it is as unjustifiable to ignore the one as the other. It is for this reason primarily that the discussions of freedom which we have considered fail to give an adequate solution of the problem. On the one hand, thinkers like James, Bergson, and Ward, subordinate reason to will, and maintain contingency regardless of the demands of reason. On the other hand, rationalists like Bosanquet exalt reason, and deny contingency without reconciling this denial with the claims of morality. *Prima facie* it appears that the one procedure is as arbitrary as the other, and that the acceptance either of voluntarism or of rationalism is a matter of personal choice. For after all there is as much likelihood that the universe meets our moral demands as that it satisfies our craving for complete rationality. Yet the difficulty is far more fundamental than this, for in spite of their conflict neither will nor reason can be independent of the other. Voluntarists may assert the primacy of the will, but they cannot procure the satisfaction of the demands set by the will itself save by the control of experience gained through reason. Moreover, any attempt on their part to prove the truth of their view and to criticize opposing theories inevitably involves a reliance upon the authority of reason. On the other hand, intellectualists can never justifiably ignore the demands of will, since the rational construction and organization which they exalt depend ultimately upon an act of will. As Augustine long ago showed, there could be no knowledge if it were not for the activity of will. Thus, neither voluntarists nor rationalists can give a complete solution to the problem of freedom.

Our discussion, then, seems to issue in a dualism of reason and will. This dualism, moreover, cannot be overcome by a return to immediacy such as is advocated by James and Bergson. The statement that we immediately experience freedom may afford us a certain satis-

faction, but, as Bosanquet so well shows, we cannot remain permanently in the realm of the immediate. The demands of reason inevitably reassert themselves. They cannot be met by being ignored. Hence no philosophic solution of any problem can be gained by recourse to the immediate.

Although the dualistic conclusion to which we have come is undoubtedly exceedingly unsatisfactory, it is, we claim, more justifiable than extreme voluntarism or extreme intellectualism. We may hope, moreover, that this dualism is not final. Human nature is ultimately one, and the mutual dependence of will and reason makes any irreconcilable conflict between them unlikely. From the early days of philosophy, and especially since the time of Kant, philosophers have been striving to work out a synthetic view of human experience which should do justice to the demands of both reason and will. So far, however, such syntheses have not proved completely satisfactory, but upon examination have been resolvable into some form of voluntarism or of intellectualism. Nevertheless, in spite of such failure, the task attempted by Hegel and other post-Kantian idealists may perhaps be successfully performed in the future by means of a new logic more capable of dealing with the concrete experience of the individual.[171] Until then, we can only hold fast to the conflicting demands of both will and reason, with the assurance that an adequate solution of the problem freedom must be gained by a frank recognition of the claims of both, rather than by a superficial and arbitrary subordination of one to the other.

[171] An indication in this direction may be found in Baldwin's *Thought and Things*, and *A Genetic Theory of Reality*. His careful discussion of the way in which the dualism of which we have spoken arises in the life of the individual and in that of the race throws new light on the subject, even though his solution of this dualism by means of the æsthetic experience is not free from difficulties.

VITA

Gertrude Carman Bussey was born in New York City, January 13, 1888. She received her primary and secondary education in New York City, and in Mount Vernon, N. Y. In 1904, she entered Barnard College, where she completed the work of the freshman year. She then transferred to Wellesley College, from which institution she received the degree of B. A. in 1908. As an undergraduate, her major work was taken in the department of physics, but she also specialized in the department of philosophy, and there completed nine hours of work in excess of the requirement for a B. A. degree. These nine hours were therefore credited towards the degree of M. A. In 1908–1909, she attended courses in philosophy under Dr. Dewey and Dr. Montague of Columbia University, and started a master's thesis under the direction of Professor Calkins of Wellesley College. The thesis, which consisted of a translation, with notes, of La Mettrie's *Man a Machine*, was completed the following year, and Miss Bussey received the degree of M. A. from Wellesley College in June, 1910. Two years later her thesis was published in a revised form, by the Open Court Co. In the year 1912–1913, Miss Bussey attended courses in philosophy and sociology at Columbia University. From 1913–1915, she was in residence at Northwestern University, holding a fellowship during 1913–1914 and a scholarship during 1914–1915.

Miss Bussey has held the following positions: Instructor in Mathematics, Brantwood Hall, Bronxville, N. Y., 1909–1912; Instructor in Philosophy, Goucher College, 1915–1916; Assistant Professor, 1916–1917.

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